It is best to discard the terminology of Unsafe Act and Unsafe Condition. If you use Error instead of unsafe act, for instance, then you can lump ALL incidents into one database, including those that appear to be only quality, reliability, process safety, etc. (those that may appear to have no relationship to occupational health [...]
Our staff has led about 10,000 HAZOP/PHA over the past 20+ years. We found in the early 1990s that using a risk matrix "live" in a HAZOP/PHA will actually hurt the brainstorming (producing less scenarios) because the team waste more time on scoring schemes while in the use of a risk matrix. Further, about 50% [...]
Here is an excellent causation model that maps a causal factor (cause) down to the management system level (root cause level): http://www.process-improvement-institute.com/_downloads/Root_Cause_Chart_PII_R6_Complimentary.pdf (This chart includes references to the original work in the legend.) It differs substantially from Dan Peterson’s approach and many others (including ILCI / SCAT) in that it is all focused on the [...]
The best overall leading indicator (KPI) we have found is the number of near hits (or near misses) divided by the of loss events (accidents). We even now know the target values for these. Less than 5 is poor and indicates you are learning more from accidents than from free near misses. Greater than 20 [...]
Process safety management is 20+ years older than the extremely weak PSM regulation from US OSHA, so to 99% of the companies around the world that implement PSM, OSHA PSM elements and interpretation is almost irrelevant. Even in the USA, most of the companies who have implemented PSM more than 10 years extend process safety [...]