

5<sup>th</sup> Global Congress on Process Safety  
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## **Optimizing Qualitative Hazard Evaluations for Maximized Brainstorming**

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**Optimizing Qualitative Hazard Evaluations for Maximized  
Brainstorming**  
(or “How to Complete A PHA/HAZOP Meetings in One-Third the Time  
Currently Required while Finding More Scenarios”)

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This paper discusses the lessons gleaned from more than 5000 qualitative hazard evaluations completed by the authors and compatriots over the past 18-years. The learnings were from project risk reviews, management of change (MOC) risk reviews, full unit process hazard analyses (PHAs), and PHA revalidations. (All of these evaluations fall within the qualitative category of CCPS’s “Hazard Identifications and Risk Assessments [HIRAs],” required in the Risk-Based Process Safety [RBPS] guide [CCPS, 2007].) The experience covers all chemical and related industry. The paper shares secrets that will speed up your hazard evaluations while *not* sacrificing thoroughness. Issues covered include: Should you project your notes during the meetings? Should you use dedicated software? Should you have a dedicated scribe? Should you define the methods and make sections/nodes ahead of the meetings? What methods should you choose? What documentation rules speed up the meeting? What facilitation rules speed up the meetings without crimping brainstorming? What mistakes kill brainstorming and also slow the meetings? Data based on thousands of PHAs is presented, along with a condensed set of optimization rules.

## Background:

PHA optimization is executing the PHA analysis with practices that are thorough and efficient. One key to optimization is optimizing *PHA Team Leadership* – the PHA leader’s ability through training and practice to run efficient meetings while driving the team to make sound engineering- and operationally-based risk decisions. In addition, developing, implementing, and maintaining a PHA management practice with detailed procedures and rules for conducting PHAs is necessary to ensure consistent and efficient implementation. However, PHA optimization is also very dependent on the strength of other process safety management (PSM) practices. The full implementation of these strong PSM elements, over time, will lead to better data needed to conduct PHAs.

Elements for Optimizing PHAs
PHA Team Leadership
PHA Rules
Implementation of Strong PSM Management Practices, related to PHA

This paper presents PHA team leadership techniques and rules, discusses content of PHA management practice, policy, and procedures, and explains the relationship of PHAs with some other PSM elements where if those elements are weak, can impact the quality of the PHA and increase the PHA meeting or documentation time.

## Source of the Optimized Rules:

The rules presented in this paper were developed through our efforts in conducting thousands of PHAs, each with slight variations (planned and unplanned experiments). The rules were established with the goal of minimizing the effort it takes to complete a thorough PHA.

The data set for these rules include:

- 18-years of PHAs
- More than 5000 PHAs performed under contract for more than 200 clients
- PHAs were performed by more than 50 leaders and 30 scribes
- Teams were all composed of excellent, required members and often some optional team members
- Leader and scribe used various commercial software packages


## Optimized Rules for PHA Team Leadership

The rules presented in this paper will be new to most of the readers. Some of the rules will be quite surprising (even controversial) and, so at first, may not be readily accepted. Since these rules have been difficult to develop and, until now, have been closely held by a few very experienced PHA leaders and instructors, we recommend that readers give these rules a try.

We also understand that some readers will ask: “Why optimize PHAs? Aren’t more meetings and more documentation better for safety?” The answer is no, as will be explained in detail later. In short, inefficient PHAs can burnout teams (lower the brainstorming and causing accident scenarios to be missed). Also, if a PHA takes 3-times longer to complete than it should, then

company leaders will be reluctant to invest more in aspects of PHAs where they are currently weak.

For example, many companies do **not** perform a thorough analysis of the risk for startup, shutdown, and on-line maintenance modes of operation; the reason normally given is that the analysis of these modes of operation takes “too long.” Yet, actually the PHA of the normal mode is taking too long and so the company has no time left for the analysis of procedures for startup and shutdown modes of operation. If these PHAs for the normal mode of operation are optimized, the organization will have time for thoroughly analyzing the non-routine modes (typically discontinuous modes) of operation and the organization will still have a net savings overall! This point is critical since 60-70% of catastrophic accidents occur during non-routine modes of operation. The Figure below illustrates this point:



**Table I & Table II** list best practices for executing efficient PHA meetings. These best practice rules for optimizing PHAs are categorized in **Table I** as **meeting preparation, leader facilitation, and documentation**. **Table II** further summarizes some best practices for **leader facilitation and documentation**.

Meeting Preparation - Pre-populating the tables with the appropriate deviations will help the leader to quickly transition from deviation-to-deviation within a node, and also transition between analysis nodes or sections. Having a scribe in the meeting (for analysis longer than 4-hours of meeting time) can help tremendously and easily pays for itself. While the scribe is completing the summary of the team's discussion, the leader can move on to the next topic of discussion.

Leader Facilitation - The PHA leader's ability to run efficient meetings requires training and practice. The Leader must be trained in best practices (not merely what guidewords to ask) and then must be coached through many sessions to practice what he or she has learned. The leader must have at least 10-years of hands-on experience in process operations and plant engineering. Other factors include the elimination of projecting meeting notes for the team to view, which tends to divert the team from brainstorming and instead focuses them on evaluating what the scribe is documenting. As a result, the leader tends to wait for the scribe to "catch up" before leading the team into the next deviation analysis. Additionally, one important rule is for the leader to drive the team to make sound risk decisions as soon as possible in the discussion.

Documentation - Though not as important at the team meetings, documentation of the meeting results is nonetheless critical for the meeting results to be useful to others. There are many styles of documentation, but some styles are more efficient than others. Tables I and II show the styles that have proven best.

*Note: The rules shaded in Table I are considered necessary for any team to be (1) compliant with government and industry standards or (2) are generally understood universally already, and therefore are considered a minimum requirement or common practice and so are NOT considered Optimization rules (but they are rules nonetheless).*

**TABLE I. General Rules for Optimized PHAs**

Best Practice Rule	Typical of Current PHAs	More details on Best Practice (i.e., how to optimize for efficiency and thoroughness)
<p>Consolidate Studies – <i>From Risk Based Process Safety, CCPS 2007, page 230</i></p>	<p>Sometimes large plants are broken into smaller units and the PHAs are performed separately for each unit. <i>Most companies already follow this rule. Therefore, we have not included it in our estimate of potential savings.</i></p>	<p>Consider analyzing an entire unit instead of analyzing processes within a unit under separate PHAs. Efficiencies will be gained because the process safety information should overlap, the team members will be almost identical, except maybe for operators. Also, this allows more rapid linking of one discussion to other discussions in other nodes, thereby reducing repetition. Be mindful though that too many consecutive meeting days may require team member substitutions. Following this rule can take one-half of the time of separate, small PHAs that are difficult to link.</p>
<p>Standardize Checklists – <i>From Risk Based Process Safety, CCPS, page 230</i></p>	<p><i>Since the mid-1990s, many companies already follow this rule. Therefore, we have not included it in our estimate of potential savings.</i></p>	<p>Saves time to have these tools available instead of requiring each leader to develop their own. This is especially true for checklists, such as Human Factors Issues and Facility Siting Issues; these two checklists have been shared across the industry since the mid-1990s. For best efficiency, use these checklists only at the end of a meeting to ensure you have not missed any issues during the pure brainstorming portion of the PHA; using them too early will overwork the checklist issues.</p>
<p>Leader and scribe should develop nodes ahead of the team meeting</p>	<p>Many (perhaps more than half) develop the nodes during the team meetings.</p>	<p>A leader/scribe can develop the total nodes before the start of the first meeting. This provides all of the blank spaces for each possible issue, so the scribe can quickly document issues that come up ahead of time. This rule is mandatory if linking is used, as described later. <b>This rule can save 10% of the meeting time and saves a little after meeting time, as well.</b></p>
<p>Make sure to follow node/section definitions that match LEADER or PHA Pro 7 software (see discussion of software later)</p>	<p>Most teams use other software that requires manually choosing each deviation to use for each section/node.</p>	<p><b>Pre-populating nodes with a standard set of deviations or what-if/checklist issues can save 10% of total project time and reduces meeting preparation time by 70%.</b> This type of optimization is what software should do for us.</p>
<p>Develop and use only a trained and experienced PHA Leader</p>	<p>A majority of team leaders do not know the rules below and therefore do not get the most from their meetings. <i>We have not included this factor in our estimate of potential savings; instead, we have assumed that each leader will have completed a minimum of 5 PHAs; applying the rules after reaching this threshold will give the</i></p>	<p>A new leader (those who have performed 0-2 PHAs on their own) will take 3-times as much time to cover the same issues and will not document the issues as well. Once a leader has performed 5+ PHAs using the rules below, they will be completing PHAs in one-third the time of other experienced leaders and one-third of a new leader, following the same rules. <i>See “Elaboration on PHA Team Leader Qualifications” later.</i></p>

Best Practice Rule	Typical of Current PHAs	More details on Best Practice (i.e., how to optimize for efficiency and thoroughness)
Make sure you have ALL required team members – such as operations specialist from the area and the process engineer	<p><i>gains listed.</i></p> <p>Most teams are structured correctly, but this has not always been the case in the past. <i>Since this rule is mandatory for all PHA standards, we have not listed this as an optimization rule.</i></p>	The correct team members are critical (paramount) to a thorough meeting, and therefore thorough PHA. <i>Since this rule is mandatory for all PHA standards, we have not listed this as an optimization rule.</i> One rule we use in our meetings is: If the senior operator or process engineer from the unit leaves the team meeting (such as to respond to some urgent plant or personal need), the meeting is halted.
Follow rules for meeting logistics	Most (but not all) teams tend to follow these rules already, so <i>we have not included this factor in our estimate of potential savings</i>	PHA teams have long been told (CCPS 1992, 2008) to meet no longer than 4-5 hrs per day and to take one week off before the next meeting (if possible). Leaders have also been taught to take frequent breaks (every 60-80 minutes) to allow the team members to get out of tunnel vision and refresh their minds and to allow the scribe to ask the leader about one or two confusing issues. It is also best to plan the breaks with hot and cold drinks and with fresh fruit (not pastries) and vegetables, since this will keep team energy higher.
Do not project/display (onto a screen) the analysis tables during PHA Team meetings	Some organizations, perhaps more than half, project/display all meeting notes “live” during the meetings.	Only project selected notes at the start of a new meeting-day to allow clarification of a confusing issue. Projecting P&IDs or procedures is fine. <b>Not projecting the scribe’s live notes can save &gt;30% in meeting time while increasing brainstorming.</b> The brainstorming increases because, if the notes are projected, the students are switching to the editor mode of their brain (while watching notes being typed). There are downsides with not projecting notes, but there are effective ways to overcome these downsides. <i>See “Elaboration on NOT Projecting Analysis Notes ‘Live’ during Team Meetings” later.</i>
Leader should press for decisions as soon as the scenario is understood	Many teams overwork each moderate and major issue.	Pressing for an early judgment of risk can eliminate redundant discussion and can also help to eliminate unnecessary recommendations if the first decision pressed for is: “Is the risk tolerable?” <b>This can save 10-20% of the meeting time and greatly reduces burn-out, since most of team’s energy goes into discussion of scenarios.</b>
Clarify which safeguards are candidate independent protection layers (IPLs)	Safeguards are a mix of IPLs, non-IPLs, and supportive management system layers.	Safeguards should be noted as either meeting IPL definition or not. This is a major advantage derived from introduction of layer of protection analysis (LOPA) in the late 1990s. <b>This does not save time, but does not take much extra time either.</b> You can view this as applying the “best” rules from use of risk matrices, which we recommend not using in PHA meetings (see later note).
Perform a PHA of startup, shutdown, emergency shutdown, and certain online maintenance modes of operation	Not performed at all in refineries and in many petrochemical plants; the PHAs in these industries tend to focus on continuous mode of operation, even though 70% of the accidents in these industries occur in non-continuous modes of operation.	PHA of all modes of operation, with What-if and 2 Guideword (and rarely 7 Guideword HAZOP) being the methods of choice for non-continuous modes of operation. See section 9.1 of AICHE/CCPS, <i>Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation procedures, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 2008</i> for coverage of this requirement. <b>This does not “save time” but it does reduce the number accidents by ensuring the process is properly safeguarded for accidents that can occur during non-routine modes of operation.</b> This also improves compliance with PSM regulations and standards. <b>This will cost 50% more time than merely doing a hazard</b>

Best Practice Rule	Typical of Current PHAs	More details on Best Practice (i.e., how to optimize for efficiency and thoroughness)
		<p><b>review of normal (e.g., continuous) mode of operation.</b> So, rather than being linked to “saving time,” the optimization aspect here is to increase the allocation of time to these modes of operation and therefore find many more high-risk scenarios for the same or lower investment in PHA time (if the other rules are also followed).</p> <p>Choose either 2 Guideword or What-If analysis methods (again, see Section 9.1 of CCPS 2008 for guidance). When documenting, list the data (causes, consequences, etc.) “by exception only” and show in the “deviation during startup,” etc., if for a non-continuous mode of a continuous process OR in a What-if style table of major procedure sub-sections (such as “preparation phase,”) if for a batch process (a process that is normally step-by-step).</p>
<p>Use a dedicated Scribe, for meetings longer than 4-total hours</p>	<p>Most meetings do not have a scribe; the reason given is “cannot afford this luxury”. However, the savings ratio in staff-hours for the whole team is about 2:1</p>	<p>Use a well-trained scribe to take the documentation load off of the team. <b>This rule can save 30-50% of meeting time and increases brainstorming</b> (because the team is not daydreaming as they wait for Leader to complete the notes). Many junior and senior engineers make excellent scribes with about 1-week of coaching during actual PHAs; attending PHA leadership training can also improve scribe skills. Non-technical secretaries/clerks have been tried as scribes, usually with poor results.</p>
<p>Use efficient Software if you do more than 2-weeks of PHA per year. (Note: Software does not increase the quality of the PHA team meetings.) This is particularly true if you mostly use HAZOP method (versus What-If or FMEA methods)</p>	<p>Many organizations use PHA Works (Primatech), PHA Pro (Dyadem), or HAZOP Manager (Lihou); some organizations do not use PHA software (they instead use MS Excel applications or MS Word).</p>	<p>All of the software vendors are competitors of PII, and so we have no vested interest in any of the existing software packages; however, PII has many years experience with each of the listed commercial products. We recommend using LEADER (by ABS Consulting) if you do a lot of HAZOP of continuous flow processes. <b>This decision can save 25% in meeting time and can save 80% in preparation time.</b> Part of the savings is due to the predefined set of deviations for each node/section type (though PHA Pro 7 now has the same capability of pre-defining deviations easily). Another part of the savings is due to the ability to link from one consequence to the cause of another deviation (even to a deviation in another section/node); LEADER is the only software with this option. Still another part of the savings is being able to decide “turn off” cause-by-cause mode of documentation when the scenarios are simpler; again, LEADER is the only software with this option. If, however, you perform less than 2-weeks of PHAs per year, then likely MS Word or Excel are your best choices, since they are free and simple and since the benefits above will not be as apparent.</p>
<p>Do not use a risk matrix in the PHA meetings</p>	<p>Use of semi-quantitative risk matrices or even LOPA within PHA meetings.</p>	<p>Only use Risk Matrix within LOPA, and only use LOPA after the PHA meetings for issues that are very confusing to the PHA team (and possibly for multiple-fatality-potential events). <b>Eliminating forced use of risk matrices (and LOPA) from PHA meetings increases brainstorming and therefore increases the number of scenarios found by 10-20%, and saves 25% in meeting time.</b></p>

Best Practice Rule	Typical of Current PHAs	More details on Best Practice (i.e., how to optimize for efficiency and thoroughness)
Use What-if (brainstorming with no guidewords) wherever you believe the risk and complexity is moderate, low, or well understood.	Many (most) organizations require use of HAZOP method in all cases (though a notable few require use of What-If in all cases).	What-If typically only takes 30-40% of the time (saves 60-70% of the time required) that HAZOP of the same system would take. Many see What-If as being too informal or less thorough than HAZOP, but experience of thousands of PHAs has taught us that What-if can be used for selected systems in nearly all PHAs, and in some cases (such as oil terminals and many utility systems), What-If is far superior. There are many PHA leaders who can lead a more thorough PHA with What-If than with HAZOP. <b>We tend to average a blend of 30% What-if in our PHAs, for a 10-20% savings in total meeting and documentation time.</b>
Use linking (especially for HAZOP of continuous modes of operation)	Less than 10% of the leaders/scribe use Linking. They instead either use repetition of causes, consequences, and safeguards; or they use “refer to” as a general statement and then attempt to list all safeguards for the entire scenario in one deviation.	Use LINKING to save time and increase speed (both). Use links from a consequence of one deviation to the cause of another deviation, to indicate the scenario path (if the ultimate consequence is of interest). The reader can follow the links forward or backward to find the related causes and safeguards elsewhere in the scenario path. This saves time by eliminating repetition of safeguards. We have also found that, typically, the quality of the final report is greatly improved, since it more accurately reflects how the scenario builds from one deviation to the next. Using linking allows using other clarity rules, such as “only show a safeguard in the deviation where it belongs.” <b>Linking can save 20-30% of meeting time and after-meeting documentation time, and also increases thoroughness, if you doing a HAZOP-based analysis of continuous operation mode. If you are doing mostly What-If, then there is no savings.</b> Linking is illustrated in Table II.
Use mostly deviation-by-deviation documentation instead of cause-by-cause documentation	More than one-half of the leaders (including all of the leaders who use PHA Pro, Lihou, and PHA Works) use only cause-by-cause documentation. Note that these three software packages only allow Cause-by-Cause style of documentation.	<b>Cause-by-cause documentation takes 20-30% longer than deviation-by-deviation documentation, and, in most instances, provides little advantage, especially for HAZOP of continuous mode. If you are doing mostly What-If, then there is no savings since cause-by-cause is usually best.</b> We have found it is best to use a mix; using cause-by-cause documentation style only when absolutely necessary, such as in complex reactor nodes/sections. Linking (described earlier) can be used in either documentation style. For more description of these styles of documentation, See section 5 of AICHE/CCPS, <i>Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation procedures, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 2008</i> ; or contact the authors of the paper. (As mentioned earlier, LEADER is the only software that automates Linking of one deviation to another deviation.)
Follow additional rules as outlined in Table II	Most leaders/teams only follow a fraction of the optimization rules listed in Table II.	<b>Following the additional rules (or clarification of earlier rules) in Table II will reduce meeting and documentation time by about 30%.</b>

## Elaboration on PHA Team Leaders Qualifications

A PHA team *must* be led by a qualified leader. As mentioned, for comparison of gains, we have already assumed that each leader has already completed 5 PHAs. There is nothing magic about this number, but after completing a few PHAs, the leader is capable of using ALL of the rules defined herein. The leader may (should) have already learned these rules on the way to completing 5 PHAs. If the leader is NOT qualified, then it does not really matter what rules they follow. The PHA will be poor quality. The rules in this paper only apply to good PHA leaders. What does this really mean? Well, we know a good/bad leader and scribe when we see them, but to put some parameters around the answer, here are minimum criteria we use for qualifying PHA leaders:

### Starting Suggested Qualifications:

- 10-years of hands-on experience in chemical or hazardous operations, with special emphasis on hands-on field or plant experience. This is critical to the leader being able to quickly understand the process under review and to be able to quickly understand the aspects of the accident scenario under review. Too many PHA leaders are “academic only” (i.e., their experience is engineering from an office or consultancy). Though we have seen some academic folks become effective leaders, its generally the folks with operations backgrounds can help a team find more of the subtle accidents scenarios during startup, shutdown, and abnormal operations.
- 10-years plus of technical background. This can include obtaining an engineering degree or equivalent experience learned in the field. Many of the best leaders we have observed have been non-degreed staff. With that said, engineers have a natural tendency for learning to be good scribes and leaders (as long as they also have some education in the school of hard-knocks, in the field or operating units).
- Quick learner – since the leader should be independent of the unit/process under review, they must have enough knowledge and experience to be able to quickly learn what the team’s concern is for a specific What-If or Deviation and to help facilitate the team through the scenario development and judgment of risk.
- Good writer – the team will need a comprehensive, yet concise/clear record of the analysis, along with easy to understand recommendations. Much of this load can be pushed to a good scribe, but for hazard review of small changes (where the risk review lasts a few minutes or a few hours), a scribe may not be warranted. It is best if the leader serves as a scribe during their training and coaching to become a Leader.
- Inherent facilitator – We look for many traits, which include personable, reasonable, the ability to summarize issues quickly, good at conflict resolution; a good sense of humor is also important.

Once someone meets the Starting Qualifications to become a Certified PHA Leader, most organizations require the candidate to complete the following steps:

1. Attend a 4-5 day course that is approved by the company. There is a lot of bad training out there and many courses are not taught by expert PHA Leaders. The trainer (external or internal) is should be carefully selected and approved by the organization. In some cases, the company will only approve one or two individuals to be their trainers (rather than approving an entire consultancy or internal group). At the end of the first step, there is normally an exam of 1-hour and, in some cases, a judgment by the instructors on the “potential” for leading a PHA in the near future. The course certificates will therefore say either that you completed the training and passed the exam, or that you are a

Candidate PHA Leader. In our experience that only qualifies you for the next step (you are *not* a leader, yet).

*There are exceptions:* In one series of multiple PHA Leadership Courses for a client, we trained about 70 individuals, most of whom met the starting qualifications. At the end of the training sessions, each had passed the exam. Of the 70, we (the instructor and the client representatives who helped in the training) concurred that one student was ready to lead or scribe at the end of the 5-day session. This is a rare exception for a rare individual. As a point of contrast, we believed that 30 of the individuals would never make good leaders, but might be good scribes and we believed some, with a little more coaching (1- or 2-weeks during actual PHAs), would make excellent leaders. Likewise, we believed that some would be good leaders eventually, but may never make good scribes. The training was excellent and the structure of the course was right (the client had tried many trainers and courses over a 10-year period before exclusively selecting PII trainers). But, the numbers above are fairly typical results after an excellent PHA Leadership course of 5-days duration.

2. The Next step at nearly all organizations is for the “best graduates” to be tutored for their first few PHAs/HAZOPs; this tutoring can be by an already qualified, expert Leader internal to the company or by an already qualified Leader from outside the company. The tutoring can take 1-week or it can take many weeks, depending primarily on the selection of the new leader candidate and how quickly he/she can learn all of the subtle lessons of how to lead and how to scribe. (By the way, it is more difficult to produce a fast and thorough scribe than it is to produce a good leader-only.)
3. The final step is for the new leader to produce his/her first report and have it critiqued by a PHA expert (internal or external). The certifier should review this final report and, if it is good enough, the leader can be certified as a PHA leader; which means they can be trusted to lead and scribe (or work with a certified scribe) to complete a PHA in good and relatively efficient order.

With this background defined, PII staff has trained about 5000 PHA leaders around the world. Of those graduates, we have certified about 200 leaders. But, there are variations across the industry, and our standards may overlap or be different than our client’s standards.

*Example:* In February 2008, we trained 8 candidate leaders from one chemical complex. They practiced on small risk reviews for 8-months. Then, in November 2008, they began to prepare for 4 large PHAs (two were revalidations, which would require significant redo). In January 2009, we completed step 2 of certifying 4 PHA leaders and 3 scribes during 2-weeks of hands-on coaching during actual PHA sessions of the large plants. The Final step will be completed in the next few months, as reports are submitted for critique, revisions, and final issuance. In the meantime, the chemical company considers these individuals certified already because they have met the companies minimum requirement of completing training, passing the exam at the end, and being tutored by a qualified leader for a minimum of 1-week following training. Once the reports are approved, the 4 Leaders and 3 Scribes will also receive a certificate from PII. ***This approach has been followed at many companies in the past 18+ years.***

## Elaboration on NOT Projecting Analysis Notes “Live” during Team Meetings

Since many readers may be used to projecting meeting notes Live during PHA team meetings, we thought it would be beneficial to compare the pros and cons. (Note that CCPS, 2008 list the pros of projecting but did not adequately cover the cons.)

Benefits of projecting notes live during a meeting:

- The team discussions can more easily be kept on track, since the team members can see exactly what checklist item, scenario, etc., is being discussed.
- All team members can see exactly what is being documented, so what is captured by the software can be truly considered as the consensus of the team.
- Documentation errors can be caught by team members and immediately corrected.

Drawbacks of projecting notes live during a meeting:

- Reduces brainstorming by drawing attention away from the discussion of accident scenarios and focusing attention of the text being typed (this causes more scenarios to be missed)
- Projecting the notes bores the team (the team’s energy is reduced and therefore the team is much less productive)
- Overall, when equivalent teams were used, the teams that projected notes found 15% less accident scenarios for only a marginal improvement in documentation of the scenarios they did find.
- In comparing the speed of meetings with and without projection, the meeting with projection takes 30% longer meeting time, even if the drawbacks of projection are known and attempted to be overcome. This cost applies to all team members (including the team leader, scribe, and participants).

Benefits of projecting other information in the meetings:

- Previously completed work (such as during a revalidation, or during the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> phase PHA of a new capital project) can be displayed if it has a bearing on the current discussion or if revalidating results.
- Key information such as the design intent (PSV specification sheet), P&IDs, plot plans, and the wording of a procedural step can be displayed to help everyone focus on the same issue or to save time and copying.

Conclusion of leading and documenting meetings with and without live projection of meeting notes:

- The reduction in brainstorming is significant. All teams miss 10-20% of the accident scenarios (and miss 5-10% of critical, large impact scenarios) that another team will catch, but a team that projects the meeting notes live tends to miss as much as 15% more accident scenarios because they do so much less brainstorming during the same period of time. The teams that watch projected notes tend to digress to analysis and editor modes quickly, instead of fully brainstorming “what can go wrong?”
- The reduction in meeting speed costs more than just additional time for each team member (which takes time away from other critical tasks related to controlling risk). This extra meeting time also leads to more burnout of the team members, and burnout leads to missed scenarios or incomplete analysis of the scenarios found.
- The benefits of projecting can generally be recovered (while *not* projecting) by good and frequent *verbal* summarization by the PHA team leader and by good communication of

the leader with a qualified and dedicated scribe. Also, the leader or scribe can, on exception, project the notes that are confusing to them; this seems to work best at the start of the next session (e.g., the next morning).

- Projection of meeting notes appears to speed up a revalidation of a previous PHA, if not much brainstorming is required, so for revalidations we are generally in favor of projecting notes live during PHA meetings.
- Projecting of meeting notes may be necessary if the leader and the scribe are both lacking, because the team will need to compensate for their inadequacies; however, we have already stated that the efficiency rules shared in this paper are for experienced, “good” leaders (not poor, inexperienced leaders).

### **Other Optimization Rules**

Summarized in **Table II** are additional best practice rules. Table II summarizes these additional rules in a “simplified” PHA analysis table format to assist the reader in “seeing” the rule in context. These rules apply to analyzing deviations for a particular process section or node. They include specific documentation rules for certain deviations, as well as more general rules; again all of these rules are targeted as achieving high efficiency with little or no sacrifice of thoroughness. Following these rules will reduce meeting and documentation time by about 30%.

#### **The following Notes will help the reader understand the entries in the DEVIATION column of Table II:**

**A** - Make sure you document each deviation that has a consequence of interest. For HAZOP, document even deviations that do not have consequences of interest.

**B**- Discuss *Loss of Containment* for each node

**C** - Reverse flow is usually a credible scenario, even if there is a check valve in the line. (If there is a check valve, and if it is inspected and tested about every 2-4 years, and if it usually passes these checks, then it can be listed as a safeguard against reverse flow.)

#### **The following Notes will help the reader understand the entries in the CONSEQUENCE column of Table II:**

**Consequences** – (Complete first for the deviation). *Go to consequences first and make sure the consequence is of interest to the organization (not below the scope assigned to or agreed to by the PHA team). If the consequence is too low, then state “No consequence of interest” in the consequence column and do not list any causes or safeguards or recommendations.*

**D** – Use LINKING to save time and increase speed (both). Use links from a consequence of one deviation to the cause of another deviation to indicate the scenario path (if the ultimate consequence is of interest). The reader can follow the links forward or backward to find the related causes and safeguards elsewhere in the scenario path.

**D** - If high pressure links to loss of containment, and if one or more PSVs are safeguards against loss of containment, then one consequence listed in high pressure must be “PSV opens on demand, releasing \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_”.

**The following Notes will help the reader understand the entries in the CAUSE column of Table II:**

**Causes** - (Complete second for the deviation, if there is a consequence of interest.)

**D** - Use LINKING to save time and increase speed (both). Use links from a consequence of one deviation to the cause of another deviation to indicate the scenario path (if the ultimate consequence is of interest). The reader can follow the links forward or backward to find the related causes and safeguards elsewhere in the scenario path.

**E** - “Thermal expansion, if liquid blocked in” is shown as a cause in loss of containment (and not shown as a cause anywhere else).

**F** - Do not show external fire as a cause of high temperature; it is instead shown as a cause of loss of containment (since it is not a “process deviation” and since flame impingement is also a concern).

**G** - Tube leak/rupture cannot cause misdirected flow, but it can leak (and therefore link) to the node that relates to the “interchanged” stream, such as linking to high concentration of contaminants.

**H** - High pressure causes high flow (in a line) and not the other way around. So, “pump over-speed,” if credible, is a cause of high pressure and then high pressure would be linked to high flow (assuming all of this leads to a consequence of interest).

**I** - Low pressure causes low flow (in a line) and not the other way around. So, “pump off,” is a cause of low pressure and then low pressure would be linked to low/no flow (assuming all of this leads to a consequence of interest).

**J** - PSV opening is not a cause of misdirected flow.

**The following Notes will help the reader understand the entries in the SAFEGUARDS column of Table II:**

**Safeguards** – (Complete third after stating the consequence for the deviation and stating the causes.)

**K** - TRV (thermal relief valve, for thermal expansion) are only shown as safeguards in loss of containment and not in high temperature, since thermal expansion is almost never an issue during normal, process deviations (but instead is usually an issue during shutdown)

**L** - PSV is not a safeguard if it is too small for the scenario listed.

**M** – Safeguards are only listed for the specific deviation and for the specific node to which they apply (flow safeguards for a line are only listed in a flow deviation; they are not listed in level deviations or pressure deviations).

**N** - Do not list a safeguard if it is associated with a cause or another safeguard (in or linked to the same deviation). In other words, all safeguards must be independent of all

other safeguards and of the causes of a scenario (we use the same definition as an independent protection layer (IPL) in the LOPA handbook). Example: If the flow control valve (FCV) failing closed is a cause, then you cannot use the flow indicator or low flow alarm (FAL) as a safeguard for the same accident scenario, if all are from the same instrument loop.

**O** - Do not list any safeguard that has not properly tested/maintained/assured. For example, interlocks must be on a reasonable check/test plan; check valves must be on an inspection/text plan; critical SOP steps must be emphasized in training and routinely practiced in the field.

**P** – A PSV is not a safeguard against high pressure, but instead is only listed in the safeguard of loss of containment (and only if the PSV is sized large enough for the scenarios listed and only if it is inspected/tested according to industry standards).

**The following Notes will help the reader understand the entries in the RECOMMENDATIONS column of Table II:**

**Recommendations** (The last column to complete for a deviation, if additional protection against the scenario is necessary.)

**Q** - Judge risk **before** moving forward to recommendations. Only list recommendations if, in the judgment of the team, the risk is too high. If you ask your team “Do you have any recommendations?” then 9 out of 10 times they will give you a recommendation. But, many times these are not necessary since the risk is already tolerable. The team should always first answer the question “Is the risk tolerable or not?” and then, if the risk is too high, discuss recommendations.

**R** - Make one recommendation for ALL the minor changes to the SOPs (but only for minor changes). Then, have one person on the team (such as an operator) keep track of all minor fixes/changes for a procedure, and reference in the recommendation who has the official copy on minor changes (who has the procedure that was marked up with minor changes during the PHA).

**S** - Make one recommendation for ALL the fixes/corrections (not the physical changes that may be recommended) to the P&IDs and other system drawings. Then, have one person on the team (such as an engineer) keep track of all fixes (on the drawings and referenced in the recommendations), and have that person maintain the official copy of the marked up drawings from the PHA. (Any necessary changes to the system must have their own recommendation.)

**T** - Make sure you designate which recommendations are Operability.

**U** - Have a formal method for closing OPEN items before meetings (cycle) ends.

**Table II. Additional Detailed Rules for Team Facilitation and Documentation**

Deviation	Cause	Consequence	Safeguards	Recommendations
A - Make sure you document each deviation that has a consequence of interest.		Make sure you ask for consequences "first." If the consequence is not of interest, then state "No consequence of interest" and move to the next deviation or concern.		
B - Discuss <i>Loss of Containment</i> for each node	D - High Pressure  E - Thermal expansion "if liquid is blocked in"  F - External Fire		K - TRV  L - PSV (do not list as a safeguard if the PSV is sized too small)	Q - Judge risk before moving forward to recommendations.  R - Make one recommendation for all minor procedure changes.
C - Reverse Flow		LINKING	Check Valves	S - Make one recommendation for all fixes/corrections to P&IDs.
Misdirected Flow	G - <del>Tube Leak/Rupture</del>  J - PSV Opens		M - In general, list safeguards for the specific deviations and for the specific node they apply	T - Make sure you designate which recommendations are operability.
High Flow	H - High Pressure			
High Pressure	H - <del>High Flow</del>  H - Pump over speed	D - Loss of Containment  D - PSV opens on demand, releasing <u>(material name)</u> to <u>(location)</u> .	P - <del>PSV</del>	U - Have a formal method for closing OPEN items before meetings (cycle) ends.
High Temperature	External fire			
Low Flow	I - Low Pressure		O - In general, do not list a safeguard if not properly tested. N - Safeguards must be independent	
Low Pressure	I - <del>Low Flow</del>  I - Pump Off			

## PSM Implementation and Its Relation to Efficient and Thorough PHAs

The PSM elements are very dependent upon one another. These interrelationships determine the management of process safety risks. While some benefits are realized from implementing a single process safety management practice, the implementation of process safety elements is not intended to be ala cart. A missing PSM element or major weaknesses of one PSM element will most certainly weaken the implementation of other PSM elements; the overall impact is a weak PSM program. The relationship between some PSM elements are stronger (or more dependent) than others. Understanding the relationship between the elements is critical for optimization of any PSM program. **Missing PSM requirements**, for instance, if the MOC system and MI program are not fully designed and implemented, **will lead to unnecessary team discussions and a larger number of recommendations generated, which adds to meeting time.**

While optimizing PSM will help to optimize PHAs, we realize this is global to all PHA leaders and scribes. There is nothing the Leader can do if the organization has a poorly implemented PSM system, but he or she will feel the effects in both less efficient and less thorough PHAs. So, for completeness we have included a summary (below) of the relationship of PHA to the rest of the organizations PSM (or RBPS) systems.

*Identify Weak Management Practices by Analyzing Types of PHA Recommendations.*

One way to recognize weaknesses in the implementation of PSM elements is to categorize PHA recommendations from previous PHAs. After several cycles of PHAs for a given process, expect the number of recommendations to decrease as the process safety design is tweaked and PSM management practices are strengthened and fully implemented. **Table III** summarizes some typical categories for PHA recommendations. If there are many across multiple PHAs, then the management practice warrants review.

<b>TABLE III Typical Categories of PHA Recommendations</b>	
▪ Process design	Indicates a possible weakness in engineering or process safety engineering standards
▪ Standard Operating Procedures Changes/Updates	Indicates a possible weakness in the procedure writing process. If there are sizeable areas of weakness, a global recommendation to rewrite the operating procedures may be necessary. Poor procedures can greatly affect the quality of the PHA. If the weakness is widespread, the PHA of the procedures should be halted.
▪ Admin/Policy/ Procedure Verification Items	Every PSM element, including PHAs, requires policies, authority, procedures, check and balances, and verification steps to work effectively. Weakness in these can lead to lower reliability of safeguards and impact the PHA.
▪ Mechanical Integrity	These may simply indicate weaknesses in documentation or communication of these systems. But, perhaps critical tasks are missing or perhaps the frequency of a task is wrong.
▪ Process Safety Information (PSI) Deficiencies/ Availability	These recommendations indicate that PSI is not up-to-date or available for the team to use to evaluate the safeguards and/or define the consequence of interest. Poor PSI can greatly affect the quality of the PHA. If the weakness is widespread, the PHA should be halted.

Process Design – Recommendations for process design changes may increase or decrease in number for a variety of reasons. As operational experience is gained, the reliability of safeguards and “lessons learned” from incident investigations could lead the team to make better risk evaluation decisions. This is related to quality of incident, near miss investigations, and documentation discussed elsewhere. Ultimately, recommendations related to improving designs indicate areas for improvement in engineering and design standards used by the organization; if these are amended to account for the recommendation, then perhaps the deficiency will not show up in the next (similar) design.

Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) Update/Corrections Recommendations – Many PHA recommendations are the result of using incorrect SOPs. As a result, these inaccuracies slow the hazard evaluation process. As the team is analyzing procedures (all procedures for batch operations and non-routine procedures for continuous processes) the leader guides the team in understanding the consequences of not performing a step or performing the step incorrectly. The team reviews the process safety information, such as operating limits and consequences of deviation, which are stated in the procedure. If the procedures are incomplete, the team must then take the time to discuss the SOP inaccuracy and take the time to recommend, in general, how the SOP should be updated. Simple recommendations like “add a warning...” or “change the operating limit to reflect the current process...” are typical but would be unnecessary if procedures were written using best practices for procedure writing, SOP changes recognized as needing approval through the MOC system, and if the MOC system recognized the need to update SOPs as a result of a process change (if the change impacted the SOP content). One ultimate solution would be developing and implementing a system for writing effective operating procedures.

Administration/Policy/Procedure Verification Recommendations – A PHA procedure is necessary to define roles and responsibilities, PHA leader qualifications, data to gather for the preparation of PHAs and for reference during the meetings, team membership requirements, and documentation requirements. Such a procedure should also include best practice rules, such as those stated in this paper.

Mechanical Integrity (MI) Recommendations - Many recommendations are the result of the team not having information on the reliability of engineered safeguards. Since the leader must drive the team to a risk decision for a scenario, the team should know or be able to reference certain information to help in deciding if the safeguards in place are adequate to control the risk at an acceptable level. Many recommendations are made to determine the frequency of a safeguard’s inspection, testing, and preventive maintenance tasks, or to improve a safeguard to the mechanical integrity program by establishing an inspection, test, or preventive maintenance for the safeguard. Recommendations related to MI may simply indicate weaknesses in documentation or communication of these systems. Perhaps, though, critical tasks are missing or the frequency of a task is wrong.

Process Safety Information (PSI) Recommendations/Verifications - Process safety information is necessary to identify valid consequences of interest for a process deviation and to evaluate the risks (the adequacy of the safeguards to prevent causes and mitigate/prevent the consequences). If the information is missing or is poorly documented, or otherwise unavailable for reference by the team, the team will not be able to fully analyze the hazards.

**Inefficiencies also arise if there is an incomplete understanding of the scenario because of missing or incomplete PSI.** As consequences are discussed, if the team does not fully understand the extent of consequences, they may understate or overstate the consequence or the

safeguards needed to control the risk. For example, consider process chemistry. If the team does not fully understand the consequences of adding an incorrect amount of catalyst, then the consequence may not be fully documented (understood); however, there is the possibility of overstating the consequence and discussing a scenario that is not credible or has no consequences of interest. Information on reaction rates, operating limits, process chemistry, chemical properties, chemical volumes, equipment design, and others, assist in determining the consequences. **If information is missing on the safeguards, then the adequacy of the safeguards to prevent the cause or mitigate the consequence may not be properly evaluated.** Often, team members cannot recall the exact alarm set point or interlock trip. This results in an “open” item where the information is located over lunch or at the end of the day. The team must then re-examine the scenario, based on the information now available. If the information cannot be located, then a recommendation must be written to develop the PSI and to reassemble the team to evaluate the scenario using the PSI.

P&IDs – P&IDs are referenced throughout PHA to verify connections, valve locations, etc. As team members realize that the P&IDs are incorrect, a discussion begins, adding to the meeting time. **Ensuring that P&IDs are up to date prior to the PHA meeting helps to minimize meeting time.**

#### *Other Management Practices Related to PHAs*

PSM elements worth a review include:

- MOC system
- Incident Investigations

Management of Change - During PHA revalidations, MOC reviews can take considerable time. If MOC documentation is incomplete (key information the revalidation team needs to ascertain that the change process included a health and safety risk review) or is of poor quality, then the PHA team will have to spend more time discussing each process change. Designing the MOC system correctly will facilitate MOC reviews during the revalidations. Thorough documentation of the risk review – what questions are asked and what process is used to determine the level of risk review required for the type of change. Documentation of the risk review including the deviations, consequences, safeguards, and any action items will be necessary for the PHA team to incorporate the process change into the PHA analysis and to allow the PHA tables to be updated to reflect the process change. Also, documentation confirming exactly what was installed and implemented is necessary so any design changes that are safeguards can be added to the PHA tables.

In the past 3-years, while conducting PSM audits, assessments, and PHA revalidations, the MOCs reviewed at 20 sites **did not include information on the risk review.** Some MOC forms had only a checked box indicating that the risk review was required or not required. Some MOC procedures contained a short questionnaire to evaluate the risk category of the change, and depending on the category, determined the type of hazard evaluation method required to further evaluate the risk. In many of these risk categorizations there was no supporting documentation of the risk review. Were these risk reviews complete? Were the risk review teams of the same composition as a PHA team? If not, can these MOCs be reflected in the revalidated PHA without a new risk review with proper team composition? **Obviously, the MOCs at these 20 sites had insufficient risk review documentation and this will greatly reduce the efficiency of the PHA Revalidation system.**

Certain risk-based questions must always be asked, so the reviewers can confidently say that the proposed change does not introduce a new risk or increase the current risk. That in itself is a level of risk review, and those questions, and their responses should be documented to help the PHA revalidation team when reviewing the MOC.

Incident Investigations – It is best practice and required by OSHA’s PSM standard to evaluate previous incidents related to the process under review. **Poor documentation of incident reports can add hours to a PHA meeting, depending on the number of reports under review.** Inefficiencies can occur at the meeting preparation phase, as well as during the PHA meeting. Electronic incident report generation and storage can make it easier to retrieve reports, but can also be a timely process depending on how the system is designed and how incidents are categorized. Some companies have a “process safety” category, but typically process safety incidents are categorized under equipment damage, environmental, loss time/injury, operational, or fire. Having to go through each category, in search of process safety incidents, is time consuming. Having a clear definition of what a process safety incident is, and properly categorizing these incidents, will make the reports easier to access and will save preparation time.

In order for the PHA team to analyze incident investigations, the report must clearly describe the incident, the root causes, recommended corrective actions, and the status of the corrective actions. If the incident investigation management practice doesn’t define investigative leadership and team requirements or, documentation and implementation requirements, then poor quality investigations can result.

If the root causes are missed or incorrectly identified, then incident investigation corrective actions will not adequately prevent the near miss or incident from recurring. (Some corrective actions are engineering/administrative controls and others are changes in the management systems to directly address the root cause.) Longer discussion times for poorly documented incidents, and most likely the generation of recommendations to address the causes or probable causes, will increase meeting time.

When reviewing PSM management practices, think in terms of how the information generated from these management practices is used in PHAS and PHA revalidations, to ensure the policies and procedures are designed to facilitate efficient PHA analyses.

### **Summary of Savings and Other Benefits**

Following the rules for PHA preparation, leadership, and documentation as described in Tables I and II, can result in PHAs meetings being completed in one-third the time of typical PHAs today. The improvements percentages listed in these tables is not necessarily additive and some rules are dependent upon others. However, we have watched some PHAs, conducted by “experienced” leaders, which took 5-6 weeks of meeting time using the wrong rules, and yet an identical unit with an identically structured team took only 6-days using the optimized rules presented here. When the documentation of the two analyses are compared, the one that took less time, but used the optimized rules, found more accident scenarios and documented them more clearly. We do not expect 80% improvement as typical, however, when all the rules are followed, we have seen dramatic improvements in both meeting speed and number of meaningful accident scenarios discussed.

For many highly experienced leaders, the meeting time may only be cut in half, instead of cut by two-thirds, if these rules are followed. All of the rules were learned through experiments

(planned or unplanned), and in all cases we tried to hold the qualifying analysis and clarity of the results to the highest standards. In most cases, 15-20 deviations (or What-if questions) per hour average speed is achievable by the listed here for meeting facilitation. If all of the rules are followed, even slightly higher “per deviation” speed is possible. Additional efficiency gains are possible within meetings if the proper mix of hazard evaluation methods are used and the proper changes are made as to choice of software. Finally, the optimal efficiency and thoroughness for preparation, meeting, and documentation phases of a PHA is achievable if all of the rules are followed. **The typical reduction in overall PHA labor cost is two-thirds, when compared to typical, un-optimized PHAs efforts.**

The tables below provide two comparisons of following the optimization rules to not following these rules. **Comparison 1** is for the same scope, but following all optimization rules and assuming an average speed for what we have observed for well trained leaders who do NOT follow these rules. **Comparison 2** is the same as Comparison 1, except analysis of operating procedures for uncovering accident scenarios during non-routine modes of operations has been added to Only the Optimized PHA column to provide comparison of un-optimized to fully-optimized PHAs.

## Comparison 1: Potential Savings when Following Optimization Rules

PHA phase	Use of Optimization Rules	Optimized: PHA Leader and Scribe (L&S) Labor	Un-Optimized: PHA Leader Labor (no scribe)
<i>Preparation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Predefining nodes and section</li> <li>Pre-populating deviations and What-If questions</li> </ul>	20 hrs total (divided equally between L&S) (5% of total time for L&S)	50 hrs total for Leader 10-15% of total for Leader
<i>Meeting</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not projecting the meeting notes live</li> <li>Pressing for decisions on risk soonest</li> <li>Use a dedicated scribe</li> <li>Use efficient software (must save time) – must support different documentation style and Linking (if you do HAZOP of continuous modes)</li> <li>Do not use risk matrix in qualitative PHAs</li> <li>Use What-if wherever possible</li> <li>Use linking for continuous-mode HAZOPs</li> <li>Use mostly D-by-D style of documentation</li> <li>Following detailed rules in Table II</li> </ul>	120 hrs total for L&S (60-meeting hrs)  (50% of total time for L&S)	200 hrs total for Leader (200-meeting hrs)  (60-75% of total for Leader)
<i>Meeting</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarifying which safeguards are candidate IPLs</li> <li>Performing analysis of startup and shutdown modes of operation</li> </ul>		
<i>After-Meeting documentation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>After-meeting benefits directly relate to meeting optimizing rules, but when using optimization rules, more load is shifted to the after-meeting effort</li> </ul>	100 hrs total for L&S (45% of total time for L&S)	60 hrs total for Leader (10-20% of total for Leader)
<i>TOTAL Labor for L&amp;S</i>	For a basis of 100 nodes of continuous HAZOP sections ( <i>no formal analysis of procedures for uncovering scenarios that can occur during non-routine operations</i> )	240 staff-hrs total (divided equally between L&S)	310 staff-hrs total for Leader
		<b>Other Team Members</b>	<b>Other Team Members</b>
<i>TOTAL Labor for 4 other participants</i>		200 staff-hrs total (divided equally between team members)	800 staff-hrs total (divided equally between team members)
		<b>Entire Team</b>	<b>Entire Team</b>
<i>TOTAL Labor for 5-6 team members (w/L only or L&amp;S)</i>		440 staff-hrs	1110 staff-hrs
<i>Accident Scenarios Found</i>		500	400

**Comparison 2: Potential Savings when Following Optimization Rules and Also when Fully Analyzing Non-Routine Modes of Operation (*the Optimized PHA column includes time to perform a complete analysis of non-routine modes of operation, whereas the Un-Optimized does not, so many more scenarios are found for less overall cost when the rules are followed and when all modes of operation are analyzed*)**

PHA phase	Use of Optimization Rules	Optimized: PHA Leader and Scribe (L&S) Labor	Un-Optimized: PHA Leader Labor (no scribe)
<i>Preparation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Predefining nodes and section</li> <li>Pre-populating deviations and What-If questions</li> </ul>	30 hrs total (divided equally between L&S) (5% of total time for L&S)	50 hrs total for Leader 10-15% of total for Leader
<i>Meeting</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not projecting the meeting notes live</li> <li>Pressing for decisions on risk soonest</li> <li>Use a dedicated scribe</li> <li>Use efficient software (must save time) – must support different documentation style and Linking (if you do HAZOP of continuous modes)</li> <li>Do not use risk matrix in qualitative PHAs</li> <li>Use What-if wherever possible</li> <li>Use linking for continuous-mode HAZOPs</li> <li>Use mostly D-by-D style of documentation</li> <li>Following detailed rules in Table II</li> </ul>	180 hrs total for L&S (90-meeting hrs)  (50% of total time for L&S)	200 hrs total for Leader (200-meeting hrs)  (60-75% of total for Leader)
<i>Meeting</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarifying which safeguards are candidate IPLs</li> <li>Performing analysis of startup and shutdown modes of operation</li> </ul>		
<i>After-Meeting documentation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>After-meeting benefits directly relate to meeting optimizing rules, but when using optimization rules, more load is shifted to the after-meeting effort</li> </ul>	160 hrs total for L&S (45% of total time for L&S)	60 hrs total for Leader (10-20% of total for Leader)
<i>TOTAL Labor for L&amp;S</i>	For a basis of 100 nodes of continuous HAZOP sections ( <i>and all related operating procedures for startup and shutdown, for Optimized case only</i> )	370 staff-hrs total (divided equally between L&S)	310 staff-hrs total for Leader
		<b>Other Team Members</b>	<b>Other Team Members</b>
<i>TOTAL Labor for 4 other participants</i>		330 staff-hrs total (divided equally between team members)	800 staff-hrs total (divided equally between team members)
		<b>Entire Team</b>	<b>Entire Team</b>
<i>TOTAL Labor for 5-6 team members (w/L only or L&amp;S)</i>		710 staff-hrs	1110 staff-hrs
<i>Accident Scenarios Found</i>		600-700 (many more are found because of analyzing non-routine modes of operation)	400

Some organizations may be reluctant to implement the changes to accommodate use of these rules. We encourage them to think through the potential savings for all team members time. Also, improvement in meeting efficiency improves brainstorming and increases the number of significant accident scenarios found. Finally, the savings obtained can be used to fully analyze hazards during non-routine modes of operation, finding even more scenarios (and more importantly finding the scenarios that are likely least safeguarded).

## **Closing**

Although more than half a million PHAs have been performed, few organizations perform these in an optimized fashion. The goal of a PHA is to identify potential accident scenarios, describe the scenario fully, and qualitatively judge the risk of the scenario. A goal of any business practice is efficiency. Both goals are readily achieved if rules for optimizing the PHA effort are strictly followed. The rules in this paper are based on thousands of PHAs, with many variations across the set. Therefore, we believe these rules represent at least a first cut at PHA optimization. Following these rules can lower the labor costs significantly for completing PHAs and can, at the same time, improve thoroughness.

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## About the Authors

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Bill is President of Process Improvement Institute (PII). Formerly, he was a director of the Risk Consulting Division of ABS Consulting (formerly JBF Associates and EQE International). He is considered one of the leading authorities on process safety engineering, risk management, and human error prevention. He has a Bachelor and Masters degree in Chemical Engineering and he has more than 30-years of chemical industry experience in process engineering, process/product development, management, safety evaluation, and operations. His last position in the chemical industry was as a chemical plant manager. Bill has helped many companies in the petroleum, petrochemical, plastic and chemical process industries develop, implement and assess PSM and risk management programs. Bill has taught PSM related courses, including process hazard analysis/HAZOP leadership, incident investigation/RCA, and management of change (MOC) since 1987. Bill helped develop and teach the first LOPA course, when he co-developed it and co-taught it within ARCO Chemicals in 1995-1996. He was a principal author of the first LOPA book for CCPS/AIChE (2001) and he is the main author for the upcoming book related to LOPA, *Independent Protection Layers and Initiating Events*, CCPS/AIChE (pending 2010). He also was a contributing author of the *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*, CCPS/AIChE (2008) and the *2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* of the same guideline (1991).

### **Revonda Tew**

Revonda is a Senior Process Engineer at Process Improvement Institute (PII). She has 17-years experience in the chemical industry, including process development, process engineering, and process safety management and evaluation. Revonda has a B.S. in Chemical Engineering and an MBA. In the early 1990's, Revonda was PSM coordinator at a large chemical manufacturing facility, where she authored and implemented policies and procedures to address industry, regulatory, and company standards. She was also part of the corporate development and training team for PSM rollout to all 12 sites of the company. She has significant hands-on experience, having led and documented many PHAs since 1995. She has also performed numerous management of change (MOC) risk reviews and several investigations, and she has led many PSM audits. She has developed customized training materials for various topics, including MOC, PHA leadership, PSM, and PSM auditing, and she is a co-instructor for these topics and for incident investigation. Revonda has experience with both community relations and crisis management and is currently involved in LEPC activities. She served as contributing author of the *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*, CCPS/AIChE (2008).

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