



## **Four Major Gaps That Are Preventing Most Companies Worldwide from Achieving Excellent Process Safety Performance**

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# **FOUR MAJOR GAPS THAT ARE PREVENTING MOST COMPANIES WORLDWIDE FROM ACHIEVING EXCELLENT PROCESS SAFETY PERFORMANCE**

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## **Abstract**

Process safety requires implementing many management systems, specific engineered features, and operating and maintenance practices effectively. Most companies believe they have done just that, and yet major accidents continue to occur. Why is that? What is missing?

This paper looks at the statistics of major accidents, combined with results from audits and assessment from more than 50 chemical, petrochemical, oil/gas, and related processing companies world-wide. The paper illustrates the four major gaps that are common to the companies/sites that keep having major accidents, compared to those companies/sites that do not have such accidents:

- Accurate and clear operating and maintenance work instructions (procedures)
- PHA of all modes of operation, especially startup, shutdown, abnormal operations, and online maintenance modes
- Getting Near Misses reported and investigated
- Addressing human factors that are missing from most management systems

The paper describes some guidance for closing each of these gaps.

## Introduction

"Process safety management (PSM) is the application of management principles to the identification, understanding, and control of process hazards to prevent process-related incidents"<sup>[1]</sup>. PSM entails development and implementation of programs or systems to ensure that the practices and equipment used in hazardous processes are adequate and are maintained appropriately. The primary categories of programs or systems have come to be called elements of PSM. However, the basic elements of PSM have been defined by many groups in a number of ways. Table 1 lists the elements of PSM systems from various industry and government groups. Many of the elements with different names have essentially the same meaning. For instance, "maintenance and inspection of facilities," together with some aspects of "personnel" practices, both under ACC's (formerly CMA's) Process Safety Code of Responsible Care<sup>TM</sup><sup>[2]</sup> are essentially the same as the single element, "mechanical integrity," under 29 CFR 1910.1190<sup>[3]</sup>.

Table 1. Comparison of PSM systems

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 EPA 40 CFR 68	AIChE/CCPS Risk-Based Process Safety (RBPS) Standard	Responsible Care® Process Safety Code
Management System	<b>Commitment to Process Safety</b>	<b>Management Leadership</b>
Employee Participation	Process Safety Culture*	Commitment*
Process Safety Information	Compliance with Standards	Accountability*
Process Hazard Analysis*	Process Safety Competency*	Performance Measurement
Operating Procedures*	Workforce Involvement*	Incident Investigation
Training*	Stakeholder Outreach	Information Sharing
Contractors	<b>Understand Hazards and Evaluate</b>	CAER Integration
Pre-Startup Safety Review	<b>Risk</b>	<b>Technology</b>
Mechanical Integrity	Process Knowledge Management	Design Documentation
Hot Work Permit	Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis	Process Hazard Information
Management of Change	<b>Manage Risk</b>	Process Hazard Analysis
Incident Investigation	Operating Procedures*	Management of Change
Emergency Planning and Response	Training and Performance*	Facilities
Compliance Audits	Safe Work Practices *	Siting
Trade Secrets	Asset Integrity and Reliability	<b>Codes and Standards</b>
	Contractor Management	Safety Reviews
	Management of Change	Maintenance and Inspection
	Operational Readiness*	Multiple Safeguards*
	Conduct of Operations*	Emergency Management
	Emergency Management	<b>Personnel</b>
	<b>Learn from Experience</b>	Job Skills*
	Incident Investigation	Safe Work Practices*
	Measures and Metrics	Initial Training*
	Auditing	Employee Proficiency*
	Management Review and Continuous	Fitness for Duty*
	Improvement	Contractors

\* Contains some of the 6 elements of a Human Factors element, but all missing elements not covered

Note that the newest definition of process safety is CCPS's *Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)*<sup>[4]</sup> replaces their earlier process safety definition. In the older definition from CCPS<sup>[1]</sup>, there was an element on Human Factors, which brought strong focus to this necessary element; in RBPS, the human factors sub-elements are now spread across 6 different elements, though some human factors were inadvertently weakened in the transition to *RBPS*.

Although nearly the entire industry agrees that implementing PSM is the right thing to do, interpreting and converting the PSM requirements into practices is unique to each company, and even unique to each plant site. Not only can the requirements be interpreted differently for each site based on local needs, but each site also starts from a different point when they begin to implement a system that is consistent with this regulation.

This paper looks at the statistics of major accidents, combined with results from audits and assessment from more than 50 chemical, petrochemical, oil/gas, and related processing companies world-wide. The paper illustrates the four major gaps that are common to the companies/sites that keep having major accidents, compared to those companies/sites that do not have such accidents:

- Accurate and clear operating and maintenance work instructions (procedures)
- PHA of all modes of operation, especially startup, shutdown, abnormal operations, and online maintenance modes
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The paper describes some guidance for closing each of these gaps.

## **1. Procedures Need to be More Accurate and Clear**

Operating and maintenance procedures have always been crucial to the safety, quality, and productivity of process systems. With the advent of new safety and quality standards such as OSHA's process safety management (PSM) regulation, OSHA's personal protective equipment (PPE) regulation, EPA's risk management program (RMP) regulation, and the ISO 9000 quality standard, many companies are facing the daunting task of developing or upgrading their procedures to satisfy varied and sometimes complex and conflicting requirements.

Although there are overlapping characteristics that the various regulations and standards share, each approaches the procedure-writing process from a somewhat different perspective (e.g., quality or safety, protection of workers or protection of the public/environment), and the required level of detail for documenting the procedures differs greatly between these regulations and standards. For instance, the ISO 9000 quality standard advocates documenting procedures and work instructions that impact quality and suggests keeping the procedures as simple as possible, while the OSHA PSM regulation requires detailed procedures that address: all operating modes (startup, shutdown, etc.), operating limits, consequences of deviations, means to avoid hazards, safety and health considerations, and safety systems and their functions. How can companies develop and maintain procedures that ensure productivity and simultaneously satisfy the different regulations and standards? The key is to remember the ultimate goal of the regulations and standards: to reduce human errors that can impact quality, productivity, and/or safety.

Procedure-related errors are errors that occur because some characteristic of the procedure caused task performance to fail. **This is currently the most critical human factor at most sites since 90% of accidents have at least one root cause related to mistakes within procedures.** Reducing these procedure deficiencies can reduce human error rates by a factor of 2 to 20 <sup>[5]</sup>.

### **1.1. Identified problems**

**Deficient Procedures** are the most prevalent problem in process industries since procedures have not traditionally been developed from the perspective of optimizing human factors; instead procedures have been traditionally developed to meet a compliance requirement. Examples of procedure deficiencies (inaccuracies) include:

- Incorrect/incomplete/nonexistent (most procedures we have audited have been only 70-75% accurate – the inaccuracies include missing critical steps, steps as written are not what needs to be done, or the steps are out of sequence)<sup>[5]</sup>
- No/misplaced/incorrect information in warnings (for example, a warning should **never contain** the action to take; it should instead **emphasize** the action to take) and warnings should be located **BEFORE** the step applicable to the warning
- Poor format and presentation rules

## 1.2. Objective

The flowchart (**Error! Reference source not found.**) and the procedure writing checklist (Table1) describes the basic sequence of steps for writing effective procedures. Note that some basic rules are contained in the flowchart, such as “operators write operating procedures,” “maintenance craft-persons write maintenance procedures,” and “Lab technicians write lab procedures.” Procedures are NOT written by engineers or department superintendents. This is a critical to ensure procedures are written in the user’s common language and are written at the right level of detail.




Figure 1. Best Approach to developing written procedures, once the unit has decided which procedures are needed (© PII 2003-2017)<sup>[6]</sup>

The procedure content controls the human error related to “procedure-based” error – if content is wrong, the trainee is very likely to learn the step wrong (trainer uses the procedure as a basis for training or the trainee refers to the procedure step that is wrong when executing the procedure).

Even if the content is correct, not following page formatting best practices can still increase human

error rates. If the content of the step is wrong it does not matter if the presentation is clear. If the content is perfect, you can further reduce error rates by 50% to 70% by presenting the information properly.

### **Rules for developing content**<sup>[7]</sup>

- The procedures should be written at the level of someone who has just completed the basic training for that task. Do not write the procedure for someone just hired or for the 10+ veteran.
- Clearly identify ahead of time what activities need procedures to help ensure error rates are controlled low enough, and identify which activities are considered common “skills” of all of the staff.

*Example: Starting a pump is typically considered a “skill.” This means a procedure step can simply be “Start the benzene recycle pump (P-119).” The procedure does not need to explain how to start the pump. But, starting a pump is a skill that nonetheless must be learned; it requires doing several sub-steps related to positioning of intake and discharge valves, how the pump is throttled at startup, checking local pressure gauge, etc. So, a training module is needed for starting pumps of various types, and the operator needs to learn this necessary skill. Once the skill is learned, it will be applied to so many various cases and so often, that a procedure is no longer needed as a “refresher” on how to “start the pump.”*

- The first draft of the procedure must be walked-down in the field by another user. Simply reading through the procedure does not catch enough of the mistakes.
- The revised draft should be reviewed in the field by a technical staff person, such as a process or operations engineer (for operating procedures).
- The procedure needs to be checked to ensure it follow the page format and step writing rules described in the next section. This ensures the accurate steps are clearly presented.

**The target is to reach an accuracy of 95% or better**<sup>[7]</sup> (so, no more than one wrong or missing step out of 20 steps). The following have been observed in the field by PII staff by direct data collection at more than 110 sites/plants around the world, based on walk-down review of several to dozens of procedures at each unit/plant:

- At 95% accuracy or better and when the same procedures follow 80% of the rules for procedure clarity (presented next), then most users will follow the written procedures and will try to keep the procedures up-to-date
- At about 85% accuracy or less, about half of the users stop using the procedures
- At about 75% accuracy or less, less than 10% of the users will refer to the procedure or will try to keep it up-to-date. **So, the written procedures are not very effective.**
- Unfortunately, the typical operating procedure walked down by PII staff (accompanied by senior operators, a process engineer, and a shift supervisor) is about 75% accurate (so one step in four is missing or wrong). Usually these inaccurate procedures also follow less than half of the best practices for procedure format, presented next<sup>[7]</sup>.

### **Procedure Clarity**

The importance of the accuracy of the procedure steps were discussed above. The clarity of the procedure steps (how they are written and how the page is formatted) is also important. Following best practices for step and page format reduces human errors by a multiplying factor of 3 to 5.<sup>[5], [7]</sup>

**The best practice rules for writing and validating procedures have been published for many years** (see *Bridges & Williams, 1997; Madden & Bridges, 2016, 2017*)<sup>[7],[8],[9]</sup>. These rules include best practices for formatting of the pages and steps. These have been gradually improved over the past decades and now are incorporated into PII’s training materials.<sup>[6]</sup>

**Table 2. Procedure quality checklist (courtesy PII, copyright 2003-2017)<sup>[6]</sup>**

#	Issue	Response
<b>Procedure Content Checklist</b>		
1	Is the procedure drafted by a future user of the written procedure? (Engineers should not author procedures to be used by operators or maintenance staff.)	
2	Is the procedure validated by a walk-down in the field by another future user of the procedures?	
3	Is the procedure reviewed and commented on by technical staff (engineers or vendors)?	
4	Is the procedure checked versus the Page and Step format rules below?	
5	Is a hazard review of step-by-step procedures performed to make sure there are sufficient safeguards (IPLs) against the errors that will occur eventually (when a step is skipped or performed wrong)?	
6	Is the content measured using "newly trained operators" to judge the % of steps that are missing, steps that are confusing or wrong, and steps that are out-of-sequence? (A score of 95% accuracy of content is good; 98% should be the targeted average.)	
<b>Page Format Checklist</b>		
1	Is the title of the procedure the largest item on the page?	
2	Is the procedure title clear and consistent with other titles, and does it uniquely describes the topic?	
3	Are the document control features the smallest items on the page?	
4	Are temporary procedures clearly identified?	
5	Is white space used effectively? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is there one blank line between each step?</li> <li>• Does indentation help the user keep their place?</li> <li>• Are the margins large enough to reduce page congestion?</li> </ul>	
6	Is type size is 12 pt font or larger?	
7	Is mixed case used for words of steps, with ALL CAPS used only for special cases (such as IF, THEN, AUTO, and WARNING)?	
8	Is the step number very simple (single level of number used)? Only an integer?	
9	Have sections or information not necessary to performing the steps been moved to the back or to another part of the manual or training guide?	
10	Are section titles bold or larger than the text font? Do sections have clear endings?	
11	Is the decision on electronic presentation versus hard copy correct? Are electronic linkages to procedures clear and accurate and easy to use? If paper is chosen, is the color of the paper appropriate?	
12	Is the overall page format (such as Outline format or Two-Column [T-Bar] format) appropriate to the use of the procedure?	
13	Are play script features added for tasks that must be coordinated between two or more users? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Play script is normally used when there are two or more hand-offs of responsibility for steps.</li> </ul>	
14	Are rules followed for formatting of Warnings, Cautions, and Notes? (See annotated rules, such as Warnings are for worker safety and Warnings must clearly standout from rest of page.)	

<b>Step Writing Checklist</b>		
1	Is each step written as a command?	
2	Is the proper level of detail used throughout? This is judged based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who will use the procedures</li> <li>• Same level of detail used in similar procedure steps</li> </ul>	
3	On average, is there only one implied action per instruction? Best practice is to average 1.2.	
4	Does the procedure indicate when sequence is important? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If sequence matters, each step should be numbered (with an integer or letter)</li> <li>• If sequence does not matter, bullet lists should be used</li> </ul>	
5	Are only common words used? Apply “education” level test (5 grade reading level is best)	
6	Do all <u>acronyms</u> , <u>abbreviations</u> , and <u>jargon</u> aid understanding? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a list of such terms for use in procedures <i>and</i> communication.</li> <li>• Use terms that users use (within reason)</li> </ul>	
7	Is each step <u>specific</u> enough? No room left to guess/interpret: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The meaning of a word or phrase (Check vs. Make sure)</li> <li>• The intent of a step or series of steps</li> <li>• A desired quantity or value</li> <li>• To what equipment the step applies</li> </ul>	
8	Is the procedure free of steps that require in-your-head <u>calculations</u> ? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Values expressed as ranges rather than targets with error bands</li> <li>• Conversion tables, worksheets, or graphs provided where needed</li> </ul>	
9	Are graphics to the user’s advantage? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No explanatory paragraphs or lengthy instructions that could be replaced by a picture</li> <li>• No impressive graphics that provide no real advantage</li> </ul>	
10	Are references to the user’s advantage? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No lengthy explanations or instructions that could be replaced by branching to a reference</li> <li>• No references to a procedure that references still another</li> <li>• No gaps or overlaps between this procedure and a referenced document</li> <li>• If branching, must branch to a procedure, not to a specific step in a procedure</li> </ul>	
11	Are rules followed for writing warnings, cautions, and conditional steps? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No more than 2 per page</li> <li>• No actions within a warning or caution (actions must always be numbered steps)</li> <li>• Warnings and Cautions contain descriptions of potential consequences</li> </ul>	

For a complete description of best practices, refer to PII’s paper “*Best practices for writing operating procedures and trouble-shooting guides*”.<sup>[7]</sup>

## **2. PHAs (Process Hazards Analyses) Need to Close Two Major Gaps**

Process Hazards is a broad term. The relationship between many components define process hazards. For a PHA team, Process Safety Information (information on the chemicals, technology and equipment) and operating procedures are necessary to identify specific components of and analyze a hazard scenario. These components include: process deviations (parametric and procedural), their causes, the process safety consequence and various safeguards for detecting deviations and causes, preventing causes, detecting and mitigating consequences and intervening safeguards. A thorough review of incident investigations also offers an opportunity to further analyze process hazards.



## 2.1. Identified problems

Over the last twenty years the CSB has brought needed attention, through its investigations of industry incidences, to two significant gaps in many current PHAs; where the teams did not identify and analyze:

- Process hazards unique to non-routine modes of operations resulting in catastrophic consequences, and
- Process hazards related to Damage Mechanisms.

Though the intent of the US OSHA PSM regulation has always been for PHA teams to analyze the hazards for all modes of operation, OSHA did not give specific requirements for addressing damage mechanisms and only recently have they increased their enforcement attention on PHA of non-routine modes of operation.

Industry has responded by modifying the *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 2008, CCPS/AIChE<sup>[10]</sup> to improve the coverage of these two main issues. API in turn issues guidance on addressing damage mechanisms<sup>[11]</sup>. Industry best practices now exist for addressing both of these weaknesses. Now, with proper approaches, a team with process safety competencies and process knowledge can thoroughly address the issues during a PHA.

Another less significant gap noted by regulators and by the US CSB has been an incomplete consideration, within the PHA, of previous incidents.

This section of the paper lays out the case from the US CSB and US OSHA on these PHA gaps:

- Poor or no coverage of hazards during non-routine modes of operations
- Poor or no coverage of damage mechanisms

## 2.2. Objectives

### 2.2.1. Hazard Evaluation of Non-Routine Modes of Operation

Non Routine modes of operation include start-up, shut-down, online maintenance and other abnormal operations. The hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of operation involves reviewing procedures using a HAZOP, simplified HAZOP, or What-if analysis to uncover potential accident scenarios associated with non-routine operations, for continuous or batch operations. Human error is more likely and more critical during non-routine operations. By analyzing procedural steps where human error is more likely, and where human error or component failure could lead to a consequence of interest, risk can be reduced. The hazard evaluation team's objective is to evaluate the risk associated with skipping steps and performing steps wrong.

The purpose of a hazard evaluation of non-routine modes of operation (governed by written procedures) is to make sure an organization has enough safeguards for the inevitable instance when a step is either performed wrong or skipped (inadvertently or due to shortcutting or other reasons).

Industry has found that a HAZOP or what-if analysis, structured to address procedures, can be used effectively for finding the great majority of accident scenarios that can occur during non-routine modes of operation<sup>[10],[12],[13],[14]</sup>. Experience shows that reviews of non-routine procedures have revealed many more hazards than merely trying to address these modes of operation during the P&ID driven hazard evaluations.

#### **General guidelines for analyzing non-routine modes of operation or batch processes**

- Define the assumptions about the system's initial status. "What is assumed to be the starting conditions when the user of the procedure begins with Step 1?"
- Define the complete design intention for each step. "Is the step actually 3 or 5 actions instead of one action? If so, what are the individual actions to accomplish this task?"

- Don't analyze safeguard steps that start with ensure, check, verify, inspect, etc., or where the consequence of skip is "loss of one level of safeguard/protection against..." There is no reason to analyze these steps since they will show up as safeguards of deviations of other steps. This approach is similar to not analyzing a PSV during a HAZOP of continuous mode (i.e., during a parametric deviation analysis); instead the PSV is shown as a safeguard against loss of containment.
- Together with an operator before the review, identify the sections of the procedures that warrant use of:
  - 7-8 Guide Words (extremely large consequences can happen if deviations occur)
  - 2 Guide Words (the system is complex, mistakes are costly, or several consequences could occur)
  - On others, use What-If (no guide words or guide phrases; for use on simpler or lower hazard systems)
- Decompose each written step into a sequence of actions (verbs)
- Apply guide words directly to the intentions of each action

The following preparation steps may also be needed prior to the procedure PHA:

- Walk through procedure in the plant with one or more operators to see the work situation and verify the accuracy of the written procedure.
- Determine if the procedure follows the best practices for "presentation" of the content; the best practices will limit the probability of human error
- Discuss generic issues related to operating procedures, such as:
  - staffing (normal and temporary)
  - human-machine interface
  - worker training, certification, etc.
  - management of change
  - policy enforcement
- Review other related procedures such as lock out/tag out and hot work.

**If the procedures are NOT >90% accurate, then redo procedures before the PHA.**

### 2.2.2. Damage mechanisms

Recently, US CSB and more and more regulators are making analysis of Damage Mechanisms (DMs) a PHA requirement. This requires that potential process damage mechanisms and their potential consequences of interest be identified. Damage mechanisms can be broken down into three main categories. These categories and examples of each are shown in the following table.

**Table 3. Types of Damage Mechanisms<sup>[15]</sup>**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Examples</b>
<b>Mechanical</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mechanical loading failure</li> <li>• Mechanical fatigue</li> <li>• Buckling</li> <li>• Cracking</li> <li>• Embrittlement</li> <li>• Ductile fracture</li> <li>• Brittle fracture</li> </ul>
<b>Chemical</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Corrosion               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uniform</li> <li>- Localized</li> <li>- Pitting</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Physical</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thermal failures               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creep</li> <li>- Thermal fatigue</li> <li>- Transformation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

The team may use aids such as piping specs, established literature and standards, any applicable MOC documents, etc. to help identify DMs. The PHA leader has several options of how to address damage mechanisms, but PII preferred approach is to discuss during HAZOP under “Loss of Containment” deviation in each node/section.

Damage mechanisms can (and sometimes *should*) be reviewed prior to the PHA. For example, all MOCs should consider damage mechanisms and their potential consequences of interest before the change is approved. The MOC should also require updates to process safety information which might be relevant to protect against DMs.

#### **Coverage of Damage Mechanism (DM) for each major section<sup>[14]</sup>**

As mentioned above this is PII’s preferred method for thoroughly covering all DM within a PHA/HAZOP of an entire unit. The benefits are that the team can more easily catch changes in DM from section to section and they can more easily identify when unique safeguards, such as Remote Isolation Valves, segregated containments (dike), and unique materials of construction are needed. To facilitate this, a list of generic causes of loss of containment and a generic list of safeguards against loss of containment are covered in the Loss of Containment (LOC) deviation of each section.

For each node (each line, each vessel, each column, etc.), the PHA team should discuss and document each damage mechanism listed in Table 3 (as a cause of loss of containment), consequence of the failure if the damage mechanism occurs, and the safeguards in place to prevent the damage mechanism, detect the mechanism before failure, prevent the release, detect and response to the release, and mitigate or contain the release.

The documentation style varies between PHAs. There are two different styles that have been acceptable in the past.

- One style (Example A, Table 4) uses a reference to a summary table of typical causes (this summary table is not shown but is similar to Table 5 of this paper) instead of listing each individual damage mechanism. In Example A, the same approach is used for safeguards. This approach saves redundant text and some time, but it requires the leader and scribe to be diligent to cover everything in the Typical tables that were referenced in the Cause and Safeguard columns. A modified approach is to

relegate some generic causes and safeguards to Typical tables for reference and then to carefully list the specific cause and/or safeguards of interest for LOC for each specific node.

**Table 4. Example A – Referencing Generic Tables for Typical Causes and Typical Safeguards**<sup>[14]</sup>

Dev	Deviation	Causes	Consequences	Existing Safeguards	Recommendations
9.10	Loss of containment	Accelerate corrosion External fire High pressure (linked from 9.7) Typical causes of loss of containment (see Table A.1)	Release to atmosphere leading to potential injury of workers and/or community	Pressure Relief Valve's 231A, B, C on Reactor and no valves in line to reactor Most lines / connections are welded construction; only a few flanges Drills conducted each year on evacuation, rescue and isolation Emergency Response personnel are trained at SABIC FTC Generic safeguards protecting against or mitigating process material releases (see Table A.2)	Safety 7. Consider changing the ITPM schedule for managing most PSVs whose inspections are too infrequent based on industry standards and best practice. For instance, the current inspection frequency for PSV-8220 on the Ammonia Receiver (I-2005G) is 9 years, whereas, consensus codes typically recommend testing/inspection every 1-4 years for PSVs in highly toxic services.

- Example B (Table 5) does not use or reference a generic or Typical list of causes (damage mechanism) or Typical safeguards, but instead develops a specific listing for the LOC deviation of each node. This style has proven easier to justify to regulators and other outside reviewers but takes more documentation effort.

**Table 5. Example B – Specific Listing of Causes and Safeguards**<sup>[14]</sup>

Dev	Deviation	Causes	Consequences	Existing Safeguards	Recommendations
1.9	Loss of containment	Corrosion/erosion External fire and/or flame impingement Gasket, packing, or seal failure Improper maintenance Material defect Operator failing to close or inadvertently opening a valve to the atmosphere (e.g., a valve at a hose connection) Railcar inadvertently derailed Valve leaking to the atmosphere High pressure (linked from 1.5) Acid corrosion caused by high concentration of water (linked from 1.8) High ambient temperature External impact (such as from a mini-engine or another railcar)	Catastrophic release of chlorine from a ruptured railcar Steady release of chlorine from a ruptured connection Steady release of chlorine from a leaky connection High pressure caused by thermal expansion of liquid chlorine if railcar is also over-full	Chlorine repair kit Derailer and warning flag to prevent impact by a mini-engine or another railcar Limited vehicular access to area Maintenance/operator response as required, including isolation if needed Operator periodically monitoring the railcar valves while unloading Personal protective equipment in the area Plugs installed in all chlorine valves to the atmosphere when the valves are not in use Relief valve on each railcar for mitigating releases caused by overpressure Supplier maintenance of railcars (per strictly enforced US DOT requirements) Video monitoring of the unloading area Concrete crossties on rail spur Dike preventing any combustibles spilled nearby from reaching the unloading rack area Concrete railroad ties in chlorine unloading area to prevent fires near railcar	10. Consider installing a chlorine detection system in the unloading and vaporizing area to help detect chlorine releases (especially at likely release points) 11. Verify that periodic maintenance and inspections are being performed in accordance with Chlorine Institute recommendations 12. Review the drainage system for the unloading area, and identify the areas that may be affected by a large chlorine release 13. Consider prohibiting the use of heavy equipment (e.g., cranes) in the unloading and vaporizing area unless special precautions to prevent equipment damage are enacted 33. Consider providing a high pressure alarm for each vaporizer 40. Consider providing a water deluge system in the unloading area to help mitigate chlorine releases from the railcar

Regardless of method, the team leader and scribe must ensure the team rigorously discusses all of the damage mechanisms in Table 5 and adequately documents the results of the damage mechanism review in the PHA/HAZOP analysis tables.

For a complete description of PHA best practices, refer to PII's paper "*Recipe for a Complete Process Hazard Analysis*".<sup>[14]</sup>

### **3. Near misses Need to be Reported and Enough of them Investigated**

We must learn from accidents and near misses to prevent recurrence. The first step in the learning process is investigation to determine the causes and underlying reasons why accidents and near misses occur. A thorough investigation of root causes will identify the management system weaknesses. Learning which management system weaknesses are leading to near misses and accidents is one of the highest value activities in which a company can invest, and learning from near misses is much cheaper than learning from accidents. Many chemical companies have implemented process safety management systems, and now they are beginning to focus on getting near misses reported and on root cause analysis. This is a very exciting trend. Unfortunately, the chemical industry gets very few near misses reported (the chemical industry is certainly not the only industry with this problem).

To understand more about near misses and getting them reported, it is best to first review the basic definitions.

*An incident is either an Accident or a Near Miss.*

*An Accident is a sequence of unplanned events and conditions that result in harm to people, environment, process, product or image.*

*A Near Miss is an unplanned sequence of events that could have caused harm if conditions were different or is allowed to progress, but did not in this instance.*

Given a consistent understanding of the definition of a near miss, it is possible to estimate how many near misses should be reported for every accident. Studies in several industries indicate that there are between 50 and 100 near misses for every accident. Also, data indicates that there are perhaps 100 erroneous acts or conditions for every near miss. This gives a total population of roughly 10,000 errors for every accident. **Figure 2** illustrates the relationships between accidents, near misses and non-incidents.




Figure 2. Relationship between Errors and Potential or Actual Impact<sup>[16]</sup>

Investigating near misses is critical to preventing accidents, because near misses share the causes and root causes of accidents; they are one or two barriers away from the loss/accident. We are very likely preventing many apparently unrelated accidents when we prevent the ones that are obviously related.

### 3.1. Identified problems

During the past 15 years, we have asked more than 5,000 students of our process safety management (PSM) courses and 3,500 students from our investigator leadership training courses how many near misses they get reported for every accident. The students represented about 400 companies, predominantly in chemical-related process industries (chemical, polymer/plastic, petrochemical, refining, oil and gas exploration, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, etc.). The answers are quite disturbing. More than 95% said that their ratio of near misses reported to accidents reported falls in the range of 0 to 20. Less than 5% of the individuals said the ratio was greater than 5, and less than 2% said the ratio was higher than 10. Students noted that fear of disciplinary action, lack of management commitment, and lack of understanding of the difference between a near miss and a non-incident were the main reasons why near misses do not get reported.<sup>[16]</sup>

In conducting about 150 PSM audits and 7000 process hazard analyses (PHAs) during the past 22 years, we have found ratios from 0 to 105. For the first half of the 1990s, more than 90% of the facilities we talked to had ratios in the range of 0 to 0.5, and more than 95% had ratios in the range of 0 to 1. In the last half of the 1990s, more than 90% of the facilities had ratios in the 0 to 1 range, and more than 95% had ratios in the 0 to 2 range. In addition, only a few (less than 2% of the facilities) had a ratio higher than 5. By 2005, many facilities had ratios in the 20 to 100 range and each of these had seen great gains (more on this in future articles), but the average across all companies we talked to increased only slightly. By 2011, the ratio of near misses to accidents (any loss event) was about 2 for companies we deal with. But by the end of 2011, many major companies had ratios well above 50!<sup>[16]</sup>

Our auditors and PHA leaders commented that the primary reasons for lack of reporting were about the same as those found in the survey. The barriers to getting near misses reported, discussed in detail later, are:

- Fear of disciplinary action.
- Fear of teasing by peers (embarrassment).
- Lack of understanding of what constitutes a near miss versus a non-incident.
- Lack of management commitment and lack of follow-through once a near miss is reported.

- An apparently high level of effort is required to report and to investigate near misses compared to low return on this investment.
- There is No Way to investigate the thousands of near misses per month or year!
- Disincentives for reporting near misses (e.g., reporting near misses hurts the department's safety performance).
- Not knowing which accident investigation system to use (or confusing reporting system).
- Company discourages near-miss reporting due to fear of legal liability if these are misused by outsiders.

The good news is that near-miss reporting appears to be improving, and the industry appears to recognize most of the barriers to near-miss reporting. The bad news is that the ratio is still very poor and improvement appears slow!

The number of companies that participated in the informal surveys suggests that the results are a statistically significant representation of the chemical industry.

A formal (written) survey was developed and e-mailed, faxed, and/or mailed to more than 100 companies. Of these, more than 12 replied originally in 1997. Since then, we have reviewed data in detail from more than a dozen major companies. These 25+ companies or affiliates provided data from more than 400 facilities, including more than 150,000 employees in manufacturing and operations. The data were from the chemical industry, polymer industry, refineries, drug/pharmaceutical companies, pulp and paper mills, petrochemical companies, and oil exploration/production.

**Table 6** summarizes the results of both the informal and formal surveys.

**Table 6. Summary of survey results** <sup>[16]</sup>

Survey Items	Informal surveys		Formal Survey (or actual organization data)
	Classroom polls	Found during Audits and PHAs	
Current Near-miss Reporting Ratio Range (0-5 years prior)	1 to 105	2 to 20	0 to 105
Previous Near-miss Reporting Ratio Range (5-10 years prior)		1 to 5	NA
Current Near-miss Reporting Ratio Average (0-5 years prior)	2-3	3	5
Previous Near-miss Reporting Ratio Average (5-10 years prior)		1	NA
Goal for Near-miss Reporting Ratio (average)	20+	NA	20
Theoretical Upper Limit on Near-miss Reporting Ratio (average)	About 100	NA	100
Number of Participating Companies	400	300+	25+
Number of Participating Facilities	8500+	500+	400+

### 3.2. Objective

**A company should strive to reach a ratio of 50-100 and investigate about 20 near misses per accident.** This will provide a statistically significant sample of all incidents (and all important errors) and provide a company with sufficient feedback on which management system weaknesses are causing the errors and component failures. Various companies with different cultures have achieved high ratios with great return on investment.

**Table 7** shows a brief description of possible solutions to overcome each one of the barriers identified in the survey.

**Table 7. Summary of Survey Results<sup>[16]</sup>**

<b>Barriers</b>	<b>Solutions</b>
Fear of disciplinary action	Implement a policy to NOT punish individuals when their errors lead to accidents and Near Misses.
Fear of teasing by peers (embarrassment)	Ensure that all employees understand the importance of near-miss reporting; demonstrate, through feedback of lessons learned.
Lack of understanding: Near miss vs Non-incident	Develop a list of "in-context" examples that illustrate what you consider to be Near Misses)and what you consider to be non-incident
Lack of management commitment and lack of follow-through on reported near misses	Hold management accountable for achieving a Near-Miss reporting ratio
Apparently high level of effort is required to report/investigate Near Misses	Ensure that the data are entered in a database and queried regularly. Share the results with employees so they can see the value of the reported near misses
There is no way to investigate the thousands of Near Misses per month	Let front-line foremen or supervisors decide if a Near Miss or accident needs to be investigated
Disincentives for reporting Near Misses	Ensure that goals and incentives are not tied to lower incident rates (since this discourages reporting), but instead provide incentives for high Near-Miss reporting ratios
Not knowing which accident investigation system to use	Have ONE incident reporting system with ONE approach
Company discourages Near Miss reporting due to fear of legal liability	Involve legal on major Near Misses and accidents to ensure the results are protected as much as possible under attorney/client privilege.



For a complete description of the possible solutions for each barrier, refer to PII's paper "*Gains from Getting Near Misses Reported*".<sup>[16]</sup>

## **4. Key Human Factors are Not being addressed**

**All accidents** (or nearly all, if you consider that there are some natural phenomena that we either cannot guard against or choose not to guard against) **result from human error**. This is because humans govern and accomplish all of the activities necessary to control the risk of accidents. Humans influence other humans in the process – not only do humans cause accidents (unintentionally) by making errors directly related to the process itself, but they also cause errors by creating deficiencies in the design and the implementation of management systems (i.e., we make errors in authorities, accountabilities, procedures, feedback, proof documents and continual improvement provisions). Ultimately, these management systems govern the human error rate by directly causing or indirectly influencing the process. The process-related activities where errors have the most influence include:

- Designing a process
- Engineering a process
- Specifying components
- Receiving and installing equipment
- Commissioning
- Operating a process
- Maintaining, inspecting and repairing a process
- Troubleshooting and shutting down the process
- Managing process, procedure, materials, facility and personnel changes

The 10 human factors categories to be controlled by companies are:

- Available Time (includes staffing Issues) – for responses only
- Stress/Stressors (includes staffing issues)
- Complexity & task design
- Experience/Training
- Procedures
- Human-Machine Interface (includes tools)
- Fitness for Duty
- Work processes & supervision
- Work Environment
- Communication

### **4.1. Identified problems**

Recent major accidents have highlighted the need for increased focus on human factors. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) cited (US CSB Video, 2006) human factor deficiencies as one of the main contributors of the catastrophic accident at the BP Texas City Refinery in March 2005<sup>[17]</sup>. The human factor deficiencies included lack of control of worker fatigue, poor human-system-interface design, poor communication by radio/phone, out-of-date and inaccurate operating procedures, and poor (no) communication between workers at shift handover. The CSB cited similar issues from many other accidents<sup>[18]</sup> and has urged industry and the U.S. OSHA (the regulator) to pay much more attention to human factors. As a result, the recent U.S. OSHA National Emphasis Program for Refineries included human factors as one of the 12 core elements.

Implementing human factor engineering and policies to prevent accidents is not a new concept. Nearly all (or all, from a more complete perspective) of the causes and root causes of major accidents in the past

30 years have been the result of poor control of human factors. This has been cited in many root causes analysis reports and papers concerning these major accidents.

Process Safety Management (PSM) systems based on OSHA's PSM standard are likely lacking the fundamental human factor elements and implementation guides that, if applied across the applicable PSM elements, would work together to reduce human error. The *Risk Based Process Safety* guideline from the CCPS/AIChE (2007) does contain these human factor requirements.

Many site and company staff do not know there are standards for the control of human factors. However, at last count there were more than 300 non-governmental standards (such as from ANSI, ISO, IEEE, etc.) for the control of human factors, and there are more than 100 government regulations and standards and guidelines. Some of the better government regulations cover aviation, marine operations (shipping) and aerospace. An organization should devote resources to finding and implementing such best practices.

The following is a description of each of the human factors mentioned above and specific ways to control each. Our data from review of more than 2000 incidents reveal that:

- 90% of accidents had at least one root cause related to deficiencies in written work instructions.
- 70% of accidents had at least one root cause related to miscommunication between workers or between workers and supervisors.
- 40% of accidents had at least one root cause related to excessive fatigue of the worker.<sup>[5]</sup>

## **4.2. Objective**

Not all errors can be prevented. Since the beginning of time, humans have tried to control error rate with more or less success. Human errors have been measured for hundreds of years. Psychologists have studied why humans make mistakes and have gradually put a science around human error probability. Today, the best models for control of human error in the workplace are generally agreed to be related to control of human factors; in turn, these have grown out of what was previously denoted performance shaping factors. What can be done to control each Human factor is discussed in greater detail next.

For a complete description of each human factor, its importance and how to control them; refer to PII's paper "*Human factors and their optimization*"<sup>[5]</sup>.

### **Time available for the task**

Task design is directly linked with this category. Process design, procedure development and worker scheduling need to take into consideration not only the time it takes to complete each task but also the time it takes to manage usual as well as potentially unusual or unexpected situations. True; we do not create norms for exceptions, but exceptions sometimes are more usual than realized.

### **Stress/Stressors**

A well-designed, organized and managed work process helps maintain and promote individual health and well-being, but stresses will arise through no fault of the organization. Supervisors should be trained to recognize stress in workers and, in severe cases, reassign them and help them get assistance to deal with the stress and in other cases, reduce their job pressures for a day by shifting assignments. A wellness program may also be necessary to help cope with stress. Simple approaches, such as training workers to recognize and deal with stress, can help most individuals. Approaches to deal with stress include positive self-talk and practicing relaxation techniques (i.e., breathing control).

### **Complexity & task design**

If roles and responsibilities for accomplishing tasks are not clearly defined, then there will be a risk of serious errors. It is also important that employees and engineers/designers understand the characteristics of the work elements involved, how each element passes information to the other, how each person

involved communicates, and that each person has guidelines to adhere to during task design and procedure development.

For optimal performance, task designers often must integrate human and automated equipment in their task analysis.

It is crucial for task designers also to have an understanding of the appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities to the various participants in a task. Understanding the characteristics and limitations of all of the humans and automated systems involved in the task (particularly critical tasks) will allow for establishing additional controls where needed.

The task analysis process includes *Task definition* which is the initial operational description of the operator tasks required for execution of a given system function; *Performance analysis* of all tasks with respect to human performance requirements; *Error and workload analysis* to be included in the design process, particularly when the likelihood of unacceptably operator error is high; and *Evaluation* since evaluating the design of a new or complex task is important to ensure that the task can be effectively performed as designed. For very high consequence scenarios involved complex human interaction, it is likely prudent to invest in a human reliability analysis (HRA).

### **Experience/training**

Training to master the Knowledge and Skills and Abilities (KSAs) required for a job may be obtained from a variety of sources. Companies provide the training or it is obtained from other sources (e.g., trade schools, universities, contractor organizations, etc.) to reach the skills and knowledge established in job descriptions. There are several factors that may result in personnel not mastering the required KSAs for a job. These include course design and delivery methods, course completion, practical skills demonstrations or simulation, and training frequency. Course design begins when the learning objectives have been identified. The design process consists of determining the delivery methods (simulator, on-the-job training, etc.), number of hours required to cover the materials, instructor qualifications, etc. Although some methods, materials and instructors may be more effective or efficient than others, the important issue is that the course content is complete and addresses all of the relevant KSAs, so that the learning objectives are met and the KSAs mastered.

Another determinant of KSA mastery is course completion. Although this factor appears obvious, there are often competing demands on personnel that may pull them out of training at times. As a result, they may miss the instruction related to specific KSAs. Testing may not identify the KSA deficiency because it is impossible to test mastery of all KSAs. Sampling techniques are used to generate examinations. If attendance and participation are not controlled, some personnel may miss training on specific KSAs and testing may not identify the deficiencies before an error is committed.

Another factor affecting KSA mastery is forgetting. An individual's ability to perform a task will degrade over time unless the relevant KSAs are refreshed. Proficiency training (i.e., refresher) will be required for some tasks to maintain the level of mastery that was demonstrated following initial training. One function of training programs is to identify those tasks that require proficiency training.

If certain tasks are performed frequently, proficiency training may be unnecessary. By performing a task, personnel practice the task and obtain feedback on where they have weaknesses. Task performance refreshes the KSAs and successful task performance verifies that proficiency has been maintained. Furthermore, since humans learn by comparison to similar activities, as a worker practices one task, they are learning about similar tasks. Care must be taken here to avoid the practice drifting away from what the procedure requires. Also, if new operators are trained by experienced operators, you must ensure that the new employee is trained according to the procedure, not whatever practice is actually being used. (Of course, ideally, the practice and procedure will be identical.)

### **Operating and maintenance procedures**

Many procedures do not follow best practices for controlling human error, and so the written procedure actually “contributes” to increased error rates. Additionally, many organizations do not have guides on how to troubleshoot (what to do when process deviations occur). The best practice rules for writing and validating procedures have been published for many years.<sup>[6], [7], [8], [9]</sup>

Procedures have not traditionally been developed from the perspective of optimizing human factors; instead, procedures have been traditionally developed to meet a compliance requirement to have written procedures. Examples of procedure deficiencies (inaccuracies) include:

- Incorrect/incomplete/nonexistent (most procedures we have audited have been only 70-85% accurate – the inaccuracies include missing critical steps, steps as written are not what needs to be done, or the steps are out of sequence)
- No/misplaced warnings or misuse of warnings (for example, a warning should never **state** the action to take; it should instead **emphasize** the action to take and the statement of the action should be in a numbered step)
- Poor format and presentation rules

### **Human-machine interface**

**Design for operability** refers to designing the Human-System Interface (HSI) to be consistent with the abilities and limitations of the personnel who will be operating it. Weaknesses in the design processes can result in an HSI that is not well suited to the tasks that personnel must perform to ensure plant safety, resulting in increased workload, decreased performance by personnel, and an increased likelihood of errors.

**Design for maintainability** refers to designing the HSI and associated plant equipment to ensure that personnel are able to perform necessary maintenance activities efficiently. Weaknesses in the design process can result in systems that impose excessive demands on personnel for maintenance and, therefore, are prone to maintenance errors or problems with reliability and availability. *If it is hard to reach, workers will make more errors, including the error of deciding it is not worth it.*

**Design for flexibility** refers to the way that changes, such as upgrades to the HSI, are planned and put into use. A new HSI component may require the user to perform functions and tasks in new ways. Skills that the user developed for managing workload when using the former design, such as ways for scanning information or executing control actions may no longer be compatible with the new design. The new HSIs must also be compatible with the remaining HSIs so that operators can use them together with limited possibilities for human error. Also, HSI modifications may not be installed or put into service all at one time, causing the user to adapt to temporary configurations that are different from both the original and final configurations. Weaknesses in HSI implementation can increase operator workload and the likelihood of errors.

### **Fitness for duty**

**Implement a company fitness-for-duty program** with a primary responsibility for detecting and preventing impaired personnel from performing tasks that may affect productivity and safety. Medical evaluations of personnel, behavioral observation programs, employee assistance programs, and drug and alcohol testing are used to detect impairment. Weaknesses in this program may allow impaired personnel to have access to vital areas in a plant where they could commit errors.

**Overtime Policies and Practices** – Most companies establish limits for work hours to reduce on-the-job fatigue and the potential consequences for poor task performance. Routine authorization for work hours in excess of those recommended may result in fatigued workers. Furthermore, a practice of excluding training or meetings that occur outside of an individual’s normal work schedule from work-hour

limitations will also contribute to fatigue. But in many cases these have weak enforcement, especially during shutdowns when the company is under stress to re-start soonest.

**Shift Scheduling** – Shift scheduling may also affect the likelihood that personnel will show performance decrements due to fatigue. A change in the assigned shift or a rotating shift schedule will disrupt circadian rhythms and may increase the likelihood of errors. So, a company must choose the proper shift rotation to allow adjustments to sleep patterns.

### **Work Processes & Supervision**

Written plant policies and procedures are meaningful only when they are enforced; otherwise, worker practices are the policy. Once discrepancies are tolerated, individual workers have to use their own judgment to decide what tasks are necessary and/or acceptable. Supervisors and managers should vigorously enforce plant policies/procedures and ensure that plant policies/procedures and practices are revised as necessary to be consistent. To enforce well, a supervisor must (1) lead by example, (2) watch workers often to ensure they are following company policies and procedures, and (3) determine the correct course of action (including recommending changes to policy and procedures) when workers are found deviating from procedures.

### **Work environment**

Programmatic causes of task environment errors are typically found in the company's processes for designing human-system interfaces or in managing maintenance activities. Other programs may also be implicated. Common programmatic causes of task environment errors include:

*Industrial Hygiene and Radiation Protection* – These programs are responsible for ensuring that task environments have been evaluated to identify hazards and that needed controls are implemented to minimize exposures. Weaknesses in these programs may result in personnel working in task environments that are conducive to errors.

*Work Planning and Control* – Weaknesses in the work planning and control system may allow work to be planned without consideration of adverse environmental conditions and performed without the necessary compensatory measures. For example, communication devices may not be provided in noisy environments to support task performance. For tasks that involve unusual physical positions or cramped workspace, additional time to complete the task may not be scheduled. Rest breaks for hot and cold environments may not be planned into the work, or additional temporary lighting may not be provided if the work site is not adequately lighted.

*Procedures* – Weaknesses in the company's procedure development process may result in the design of procedures that are inappropriate for the conditions in which they will be used. For example, procedures that may be used at night, outside and in the rain should be laminated and the type size should be larger to ensure the procedure can be read. Procedures that will be used in vibration conditions may also require larger type size than procedures read in the stationary environment of the control room.

*Human Factors Engineering* – Weaknesses in the human factors engineering program may result in the installation of new equipment or systems without consideration of task environment characteristics. For example, the impact of control room lighting on the visibility of digital displays or effects of vibration on the legibility of dials or gauges at local control stations should be considered before installation.

### **Communication**

Successful communication requires several steps. The sender first develops the intention to communicate either verbally or in writing. The sender then composes a message that presents the meaning as clearly as possible. The receiver must pay attention to the message and then interpret its meaning. If the communication is successful, the receiver interprets the message consistently with the sender's intended meaning. Table 8 summarizes the rules for successful verbal communication.

The similarity of the meanings given to the message by the sender and receiver can be verified through feedback. An example of feedback verification in verbal communication is when the receiver "repeats back" the message and the sender either agrees with the receiver's repeat back or corrects it. Verification feedback serves an important error-checking function in the communication process. It also allows supervisory oversight of communications to catch errors before they have consequences.

A sender and receiver must both be active for communication to be effective. The sender and receiver share responsibility for ensuring successful communication. However, when companies analyze the causes of events, errors in sending messages are more often identified than errors in receiving. The reasons for the difference are unclear. A company's investigation should consider sending and receiving errors and corrective actions should address both to be effective.

***Shift handover is another critical aspect of communication.*** The status of equipment, repairs that occurred, problems faced, upcoming chores, etc., are all key information the oncoming worker will need to know. One good guide on shift turnover is U.S. DOE 1038-93.<sup>[19]</sup>

**Table 8. Rules for effective verbal (face-to-face, radio, phone) Communication (© PII, 2012)**

#	Communication rules
1	Senders MUST require repeat back by the receiver; ask questions to make sure of understanding.
2	Receivers of messages MUST repeat a message they receive.
3	Communicate one task at a time.
4	Sender & receiver must use the standard name and component number (and building name and number) and/or for related reference material (drawing, procedure name/number) in each message.
5	Sender must require receiver to give feedback of foreseeable conflicts. Sender (if message is to subordinate) should follow-up in the field if possible, to make sure message was understood.
6	Receiver must request clarification anytime they believe the message is confusing.
7	Do NOT give verbal instructions to workers who do not have the demonstrated skills to correctly understand and perform the task assignment (unless you plan to supervise/coach the task yourself).
8	Communicate to the most senior member on the work crew.
9	Know your audience & change message accordingly to compensate for lack of knowledge (when appropriate; see other related rules).
10	Use units (and use approved units, such as SI) for process parameters.
11	Always count from left to right when giving instructions related to multiple choices of equipment.
12	Use approved jargon only.
13	Use the words <b>check</b> , <b>make sure</b> , and <b>actions</b> consistently (see procedure writing rules).
14	When possible, write out the task (use a special procedure or work order) rather than communicating verbally. Use formalized templates for consistency and make sure the receiver is provided all information (such as work orders and drawings) necessary for the task.
15	Perform pre-job meeting with work crew (including with contractors or construction company).
16	Perform walkthrough at the location where the work will be completed.
17	Have a backup communication method. Don't rely on one mode of communication. In emergency situations have hand signals as backup to loss of verbal communication.
18	Talk to the operator or technician who is doing the work (no delegation of work); but see Rule 8.
19	Receiver (worker or group) must report back when work is complete.
20	If confusion exists in implementing a task, the shift supervisor (and higher, if supervisor is unavailable) must be contacted to make sure he/she understands the problem.
21	Do NOT use a PA (public address system) for process instructions, since this method of communication does not allow repeat-back.
22	Use Open questions and non-confrontational questioning methods when requesting clarification.
23	When communicating remotely (by phone or radio), if the message is not understood on the second attempt at clarification the Sender must find the Receiver and communicate face-to-face.
24	For large or complicated jobs, in addition to repeat back, the sender must ask the receiver for an assessment of the pre-job briefing to ensure the workers are not confused.
25	Workers and supervisors must keep a shift log to aid in turnover between shifts. Workers and supervisors and support staff (if necessary) must have a minimum of 15 minutes overlap with a relieving shift. See <i>shift turnover standard for more details</i> .

## Conclusion

Closing the gaps in these 4 areas has a greater than 100:1 payback!

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

**ACC** - American Chemistry Council

**AIChE** – American Institute of Chemical Engineers

**API** – American Petroleum Institute

**CCPS** – Center for Chemical Process Safety (of AIChE)

**CMA** - Chemical Manufacturers Association

**CSB** – Chemical Safety Board

**DM** – Damage Mechanisms

**FMEA** – Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

**GCPS** -- Global Congress of Process safety

**HAZOP** – Hazard and Operability; as in HAZOP Analysis or HAZOP Study

**HRA** – Human Reliability Analysis

**HSI** – Human-System Interface

**KSA** – Knowledge, skills and abilities

**LOC** – Loss of containment

**LOPA** – Layer of Protection Analysis

**MOC** – Management of Change

**OSHA** - US Occupational and Health Administration

**PHA** – Process Hazard Analysis

**PSM** – Process Safety Management

**RBPS** – Risk Based Process Safety

**SOP** – Standard Operating Procedure

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